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No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use: Is




The Biotech Century-A Biotech Revolution-not just
the excited hyperbole of a hopeful venture capitalist or a
few impressionable investors-these are fitting phrases
describing a phenomenon that has exploded into the world's
spotlight.1 Biotechnology, though existing in limited form
t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, 2005;
B.S., Niagara University, 2001.
1. See, e.g., RICHARD W. OLIVER, THE COMING BIOTECH AGE: THE BUSINESS OF
BIO-MATERIALS 70-72 (1999) (noting the 2006 projected dollar amount and GDP
for biotech products in the United States); JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH
CENTURY: HARNESSING THE GENE AND REMAKING THE WORLD 15 (1998) (noting
that the more than 1,300 biotech companies in the United States with over
100,000 employees "has occurred in only the first decade of a technological ...
revolution that will likely span several centuries."). Though Mr. Rifkin denies
personally that he is opposed to technological advancement, id. at 227-237,
others find him an opponent of the biotech industry noting his notorious patent
application for a 50% human-animal chimeric in 1997. The patent was denied.
See also ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 130-31 (3d ed. 2002); Rochelle K. Seide &
Carmella L. Stephens, Ethical Issues and Application of Patent Laws in
Biotechnology, in WHO OWNS LIFE?, at 59, 67 (David Magnus et al. eds., 2002).
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for thousands of years,2 has been poised to leave the prac-
tice arena and enter center stage since Watson and Crick
unlocked the storehouse of DNA in 1953. 3 The Information
Age made its entrance at nearly the same time, making
possible many of the advancements in biotechnology, but it
now moves backstage behind the coming biotech revolu-
tion.4 Biotech-an abbreviation chosen for a role in the phe-
nomenon along with biologics, bioethics, bioinformatics,
biomedicine, bioeconomics and many more-takes a promi-
nent position in the development of innovative medical
research.5 As one author notes, "[Mledical discovery [used
to be] based mainly on observation and serendipity. The
discovery of penicillin is a classic example. '6 Yes, Alexander
Fleming's finding of antibiotics may have been serendipi-
tous, but the road to this century's new drugs is far more
likely to be meticulously and carefully planned.7 Not
accidental or fortuitous, the development of Gleevec is a
prime example.8 This drug has been hailed as a great
breakthrough in cancer therapy, receiving perhaps the fast-
est Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval ever,
due to astounding results in its early clinical trials.9
2. See, e.g., OLIVER, supra note 1, at 118-19.
3. See, e.g., LESLIE ALAN HORVITz, EUREKA! SCIENTIFIC BREAKTHROUGHS THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD 198-206 (2002).
4. See OLIVER, supra note 1, at 7-11. See also RIFKIN, supra note 1, at 9
(noting the computer's role in managing genetic information); Jim Hopkins,
Venture Capital Flows into Biotech, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 2004, at 2B (noting
increased interest in biotech for development of drugs and biologics while
computer investment falls).
5. See, e.g.,OLIVER, supra note 1, at 115-23; GEORGE WOLFF, THE BIOTECH
INVESTOR'S BIBLE 9 (2001).
6.TOM ABATE, THE BIOTECH INVESTOR: HOW TO PROFIT FROM THE COMING
BOOM IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 97 (2003).
7. Id. at 97-98.
8. See, e.g., GERALD WEISSMANN, THE YEAR OF THE GENOME: A DIARY OF THE
BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 34-38 (2002). The impetus in the creation of new drugs
is to target the defect without affecting the other cells in the body. Gleevec is
an example of one of the new "target" drugs.
9. WEISSMANN, supra note 8, at 34 (quoting Tommy Thompson, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, in May of 2001, announcing FDA approval of
Gleevec as a "medical breakthrough[ I that is outstanding"). See also Michelle
Healy, Leukemia Drug Glivec Clears Cancer in Trial, USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 2000,
at 9D; Talk of the Nation: Targeted Cancer Drugs (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast,
June 1, 2001), at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=
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Gleevec's development was carefully initiated and pains-
takingly planned after decades of cellular research and
advancement involving deliberate attention first, to normal
mechanisms of cell growth and then, to detailed minutia of
the mechanisms behind cellular abnormalities. 10
Biotechnology is truly at the forefront of today's medical
research. Genetically engineered biologics 1 are used to
treat heart disease, cancer, AIDS, strokes, kidney and liver
disease, diabetes, anemia, cystic fibrosis, and autoimmune
diseases like multiple sclerosis and lupus, while other uses
include vaccines and disease screening. 12 Not only the end-
product biologics themselves, but biotech tools are also ma-
jor players in this new revolution. 13 The tools include innu-
1123743 (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). Gleevec has also had good success in some
other cancers besides chronic myelogenous leukemia. See Kathleen Fackelman,
Leukemia Drug Gets Rave Review, USA TODAY, Feb. 27, 2002, at D8.
10. Gleevec (imatinib mesylate), marketed as Glivec abroad and known as
STI-571 in early research trials, is a tyrosine kinase inhibitor at the cellular
level-preventing components from receiving the signals leading to continued
production of malignant cells, rather allowing for a "natural death" of the
unnatural cells. See, e.g., Alan 0. Perantoni, Cancer-Associated Genes, in THE
BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF CANCER 133-61 (1998) (discussing tyrosine kinase
inhibitors, cell signaling and cell death). Far from being a quick discovery,
Gleevec is the result of a culmination of biotech research of the past half-
century with the cause of the particular leukemia discovered in 1960, Robert G.
McKinnell, Cancer Genetics, id., at 121-23, and research continuing across
continents and in multiple laboratories. See, e.g., Philipp le Coutre et al., In
Vivo Eradication of Human BCR/ABL-Positive Leukemia Cells with an ABL
Kinase Inhibitor, 91 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 163 (1999) (conducting research in
Italy); Michael W. N. Deininger et al., The Tyrosine Kinase Inhibitor
CGP57148B Selectively Inhibits the Growth of BCR-ABL-Positive Cells, 90
BLOOD 3691 (1997) (conducting research in the United Kingdom); Bernd
Kasper et al., Favorable Therapeutic Index of a p210(BCR-ABL)-Specific
Tyrosine Kinase Inhibitor, 44 CANCER CHEMOTHERAPY PHARMACOLOGY 433
(1999) (conducting research in Germany); Shingo Dan et al., Selective Induction
of Apoptosis in Philadelphia Chromosome-Positive Chronic Myelogenous
Leukemia Cells by an Inhibitor of BCR-ABL Tyrosine Kinase, CGP 57148, 5
CELL DEATH AND DIFFERENTIAL 710 (1998) (conducting research in Japan).
11. The FDA categorizes biologics as medical products such as vaccines,
blood derivatives, tests for genetics, cells, tissues, and biological modifiers for
treating cancer, arthritis and other diseases. The first Biologics Control Act
was passed in 1902 as the result of a tragedy involving a diphtheria vaccine
tainted with tetanus. See the FDA website, at http://www.fda.gov (last visited
Mar. 14, 2005).
12. See, e.g., RIFKIN, supra note 1, at 22-23.
13. See, e.g., ABATE, supra note 6, at 58-68, 97-98 (describing a variety of
tools produced by different biotech companies); CYNTHIA ROBBINS-ROTH, PH.D.,
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merable products and processes used in scientific laborato-
ries including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents,
animal models, growth factors, gene sequences, microar-
rays, DNA libraries, clones, cloning tools (such as poly-
merase chain reaction or PCR), and screening methods, as
well as laboratory equipment and machines. 14 At each step
of the development of a new treatment or medical discovery,
biotech tools are not just props in the background but
essential elements without which the task is not just formi-
dable, but impossible.
15
Dr. David Cheresh was involved in precisely this sort of
innovative research when he found that blocking particular
receptors or doors on the surface of cells would inhibit the
production of new blood vessels. 16 Angiogenesis is the
technical name for the growth of these vessels, and it is a
vital element in the spread of tumors and malignancy.
17
The pharmaceutical giant, Merck, realizing the importance
of this discovery, hired Dr. Charesh and his employer,
Scripps Foundation, to research potential drug candidates
by finding those that inhibit angiogenesis.l8 In his research
Dr. Charesh used a very short sequence from a human pro-
tein that is known to bind to these particular cell receptors
or doors, thereby causing cell adhesion and promoting blood
vessel growth. 19 Dr. Charesh tested various potential drug
candidates to see which ones prevented the short peptide
from binding to the receptors. 20 If a candidate prevented
FROM ALCHEMY TO IPO: THE BUSINESS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 118 (2000) ("The key
to discovery is using the emerging new tools of molecular biology, cell biology,
assay development, combinatorial chemistry, and high-throughput screening to
probe the inner workings of cells and decipher just what is causing disease.").
See also infra note 182 and accompanying text.
14. See National Institutes of Health (NIH) Report of the Working Group on
Research Tools (June 4, 1998), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/
researchtools/index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
15. See ROBBINS-ROTH, supra note 13, at 12.
16. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KgaA, 331 F.3d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005); see infra
note 397.
17. Id. See also Robert G. McKinnell, Metastasis, in THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS
OF CANCER, supra note 10, at 50, 67-68.
18. Integra, 331 F.3d at 862-63, 874.




the binding, it could potentially prevent new blood vessel
growth, thereby starving an existing tumor and preventing
the spread of new tumors. 21 Dr. Charesh found a number of
possibilities and after running numerous tests including
toxicology and administration routes, one drug candidate in
particular was chosen for clinical development. 22 The poten-
tial drug candidate's path would, however, take a different
route.
Integra Lifesciences owns the patent to the short
peptide of only three amino acids that was used by Dr.
Charesh for screening.23 Integra is a biotech company
whose business has primarily involved the development of
prosthetics such as materials for blood vessel grafts and
agents used in regeneration of human tissue.24 The patent
applications filed by Integra for the peptide make no men-
tion of its use as a screening tool.25 Rather, the patent
applications list utilitarian possibilities such as wound
healing following surgery or assisting with cell adhesion to
flasks when growing cultures for research. 26 To this date
the peptide has apparently not been developed for any of
the uses described by Integra in the patent applications.
27
Upon learning of Dr. Charesh's research, Integra noti-
fied Merck of potential infringing activity and then sued
Merck when licensing negotiations failed.28 Merck's defense
claimed safe harbor through the Hatch-Waxman Act,
passed by Congress expressly for the purpose of exempting
21. Id.
22. Id. at 863, 874.
23. Id. at 862.
24. See Integra Lifesciences's webpage, at http://www.integra-ls.com (last
visited Feb. 16, 2005).
25. U.S. Patent No. 4,789,734 (issued Dec. 6, 1988); U.S. Patent No.
4,792,525 (issued Dec. 20, 1988); U.S. Patent No. 4,879,237 (issued Nov. 7,
1989); U.S. Patent No. 4,988,621 (issued Jan. 29, 1991); U.S. Patent No. 5,695,
997 (issued Dec. 9, 1997), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2005).
26. Id.
27. See supra note 24.
28. Integra, 331 F.3d at 863.
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drugs, that are seeking FDA approval, from infringement. 29
However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) 3° ruled in June of 2003 that Merck was guilty of
patent infringement. 31 Though the safe harbor provision of
Hatch-Waxman had been expanded by the courts to in-
clude, not just the drugs under FDA regulation but also bio-
tech tools used to develop these drugs, the CAFC called a
halt to this upstream protection of biotech tools in its
Integra decision. 32 Ironically, if Merck had been farther
along in development of its cancer drug, safe harbor might
have been available for its use of the peptide as a biotech
tool for screening potential drugs.
33
There is another judicial decision from the summer of
2003 affecting the future availability of research tools. In
June, the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari in
Madey v. Duke, letting the prior CAFC ruling stand that
had found Duke University guilty of patent infringement
for its laboratory use of laser equipment. 34 Duke University
claimed an experimental use defense for its operation of the
research tool patented by one of Duke's former professors.
35
The court refused to apply an experimental use exemption
for patent infringement, continuing to construe this com-
mon law provision very narrowly. 36
The courts' expansion of Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor
provision prior to Integra is evidence of a recognized need
29. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360cc (2003); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1993); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271,
282 (2003)) (hereinafter Hatch-Waxman).
30. In 1982 Congress created the new Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit with one of its primary functions being to hear all patent appeals from
the federal district courts (previously the Court of Customs and Patents
Appeals).
31. Integra, 331 F. 3d at 872.
32. Though the dissent in Integra objects to calling the infringed peptide a
"research tool," others define biotech tools as any type of product used by
scientists in the laboratory. Integra, 331 F.3d at 872, 878. See also supra note
14 and accompanying text.
33. Integra, 331 F.3d at 877.
34. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F. 3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539
U.S. 958 (2003).
35. Id. at 1353, 1355.
36. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 246-69.
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for an exemption from patent infringement for biotech
tools.8 7 The Integra decision shuts down that passage into a
safe harbor while Madey ensures that no other gate will be
opened in its place. 38 With the impact of biotech tools felt
in all areas of medical research, these two judicial decisions
are key to the future development of therapies, drugs, and
biologics for Americans. Medical research needs to develop
unimpeded by licensing disagreements, competitors' block-
ing patents,39 or judicial decisions bound by a presumption
of patent validity.40 The American public cannot be assured
that the best in medical research and innovation will be
available under the system currently in place. Is it time for
compulsory licensing of biotech tools?
I. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Basis
The Constitution's Framers felt strongly enough about
the benefit to the public of patent protection that provision
for these limited monopolies was included in the Constitu-
tion. Congress has the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries. '41 Thomas Jefferson was
instrumental in passage of the first U.S. Patent Act of 1790,
and was included, as Secretary of State, in the first body to
administer patents.42 Jefferson believed that limited mo-
nopolies were necessary to see continued progress in inven-
37. See infra text accompanying notes 127-205.
38. Integra, 331 F.3d at 872; Madey, 307 F. 3d at 1364.
39. Blocking patents refers to an improvement on a patented invention that
requires licensing to practice because otherwise it infringes upon the original
invention. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. R. 839, 860-62 (1990).
40. See To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and
Patent Law and Policy, FTC Rep., Exec. Summ., at 8 (Oct. 2003) (recommending
that challenges of a patent's validity should be proved by a lesser standard than
is presently used).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
42. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 109 (3d ed. 2003).
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tions that would eventually benefit the public, though he
was initially not a proponent of a monopolistic system for
patents.43 In a 1966 patent case the Supreme Court notes, "
Jefferson, like other Americans, had an instinctive aversion
to monopolies. It was a monopoly on tea that sparked the
Revolution and Jefferson certainly did not favor an equiva-
lent form of monopoly under the new government."44 This
grant of an "exclusive Right" (monopoly) was for the specific
purpose of encouraging invention and was specifically noted
"for limited Times" only.
45
B. Philosophy
It is clear from Jefferson's writings that the key compo-
nent in granting patent monopolies was to benefit the
public, an economic/utilitarian philosophy of patent law as
opposed to a reward for labor (also called sweat of the brow)
or a natural rights theory, prominent in the European
philosophy of patent law. 46 In every recent decade the
Supreme Court has emphasized that the purpose behind in-
tellectual property law in the United States is to benefit the
public. In the important 1966 case, Graham v. Deere, the
Court stresses this intent in speaking of the 1793 Patent
Act author, Thomas Jefferson. Justice Clark notes, "He
[Jefferson] rejected a natural-rights theory in intellectual
property rights and clearly recognized the social and
economic rationale of the patent system. The patent mo-
nopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his
natural right in his discoveries." 47 In 1974 the Court states,
"The patent laws promote ... progress ... [to] have a posi-
tive effect on society through the introduction of new prod-
ucts and processes of manufacture into the economy [with]
better lives for our citizens. '48 In its consequential 1984
43. See Graham v. Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (citing V WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON (Ford, ed 1985, and Washington, ed)).
44. Id. at 7.
45. U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46. MERGES ET AL, supra note 42, at 2-5, 10-11. See also CRAIG JOYCE ET AL.,
COPYRIGHT LAw 56-65 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing differences in continental and
U.S. intellectual property philosophies).
47. Graham, 383 U.S. at 8-9.
48. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
358 [Vol. 53
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decision, Sony v. Universal Studios, the Court reiterates,
"The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a spe-
cial private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved."
49
And, yet again in 1991 Justice O'Connor writes, "The pri-
mary objective of [intellectual property law] is not to reward
the labor ... but 'to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts."'5
0
Patent rights in the United States do not exist because
of a recognized innate right of an inventor to monopolize his
invention. 51 The economic reward produced through limited
monopolies is provided as an incentive for the ultimate
benefit to the public from advancement in the designated
fields.52 The Framers recognized this principle, and the
Supreme Court continues to uphold this philosophy in its
rulings.53 The Legislature has accepted its role, carving out
exceptions that place additional limitations on the rights
created by the Patent Act when necessitated by public
interest.5
4
C. Evolution of the Patent System
In 1836 the patent system was revised to include a for-
mal administrative system for examination of patent appli-
cations by professionals, in order to determine validity.
55
49. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 416, 429
(1984).
50. Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349
(1991)(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
52. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50. See also ARTHUR R. MILLER &
MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 16-17 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the bargain or
contract theory of patent law where rewards are offered as an incentive as
opposed to the "natural rights" theory).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 360-62, 367-73.
55. MERGES ET AL., supra note 42, at 109. Under the system originally
established in 1790, the "examining " group was comprised of the Secretary of
State (Jefferson), the Secretary of the Department of War, and the Attorney
General. In the 1793 Patent Act this was changed to a registration system until
the 1836 revision reverted back to examination. See also MERGES & DUFFY,
2005] 359
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This system continues today through the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). In 1952 a major codification of
U.S. Patent Law was completed, bringing the system into
the modern era of patent procedure as known today.5 6 This
was the last major revision of U.S. Patent Law until
compliance with the revised General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade required some significant changes in 1994. 57 The
U.S. patent term was changed from seventeen years at
issuance of the patent, to twenty years from the date of fil-
ing the application with the PTO. 58 The changes were
greater, however, in developing countries as these signato-
ries of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS), in becoming members of the
newly formed World Trade Organization, were now
required to allow patenting of pharmaceuticals.
59
supra note 1, at 8-9; John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent
Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 685, 714 (2002).
56. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 10. The 1952 revision was the last
and third (following 1793 and 1836) major revision of Patent Law in the United
States. The present Patent Act is codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-132 (2002).
57. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, revised by Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994).
58. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, 96 (1994) (hereinafter TRIPS Agreement). Since
the average time from application filing to issuance is close to three years, the
extension may not be that significant. Prior to the revision of 1836 a patent
term in the United States was for 14 years, the period of two terms of an
apprenticeship in the Old World trade system. In 1836 a 7 year renewable term
was added for a total of 21 years. The 17 year term existing until 1994 was the
result of an 1861 legislative compromise. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 42, at
114 n.26.
59. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 58, art. 27 (requiring patents to be
available for inventions "in all fields of technology"); MERGES & DUFFY, supra
note 1 at 57. See also generally Duffy, supra note 55; Dora Kripapuri, Comment,
Reasoned Compulsory Licensing: Applying U.S. Antitrust's 'Rule of Reason" to
TRIP's Compulsory Licensing Provision, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669 (2002). See
also infra notes 344-47, 374-81 and accompanying text.
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The Patent Act states that a patent may be procured for
"any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof.' '60 This provides four basic categories of patentable
inventions plus a blanket provision for an improvement on
any of the four-process, machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition. The improvement provision highlights one problem
with the lack of an infringement defense for experimental
use in U.S. Patent Law. Unless a patent term has expired,
how can an improvement be created without infringing on
the unimproved, patented invention?61 Without either safe
harbor or an experimental use exception, unless a license is
secured from the patent holder, it is unlikely that improve-
ments can be made. 62 This is not without significance for
technological inventions, particularly in the area of medical
research. 63
Patentable subject matter has been expanded through
the years to include natural substances and life forms. 64 In
60. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
61. In Europe, a patent right for first users exists to allow a defense for
infringement for a first inventor by a second who files a patent on the invention.
In 1999 Congress amended the Patent Law to include a "prior user right"
defense for infringement of a "method of doing or conducting business." 35
U.S.C. § 273 (1999).This amendment came one year after the CAFC ruling in
State Street allowing patenting of a computer business method. State St. Bank
& Trust Co v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
However, if there's a first user under U.S. Patent Law, the invention should not
be patentable since the second user is not the original inventor. 35 U.S.C. § 111
(2002). (Only an original inventor can apply for a patent in the United States
though assignments of rights are frequently made, for example, to the
inventor's employer. In Europe a patent is granted to the first to file, rather
than the first to invent.) It should be noted that the U.S. "prior user right" may
not be in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement since article 27, though not
prohibiting a prior user defense, does require that a defense be applicable to all
fields. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 173.
62. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 39, at 861-62.
63. See id.
64. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912)
(ruling that a purified substance from a living creature, adrenaline, is
patentable); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that a
living organism, genetically engineered bacteria, can be patented).
Interestingly, though the European Patent Convention prohibits the patenting
of plant or animal "varieties," a patent was eventually granted for the
362 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
general, however, patents are not granted for laws of na-
ture, physical phenomena, or abstract ideas. 65 Patents must
also meet requirements related to novelty (created by the
applicant and not in public use for more than one year from
the date of filing), usefulness (no perpetual motion ma-
chines, but just about anything else goes),66  and
nonobviousness (lots of leeway here as well).67 In addition,
the application to the PTO must include a written descrip-
tion and the best mode of practicing the invention so that
someone "skilled in the art" will be enabled to reproduce
and practice the invention.68 The description and enable-
ment requirements are key in providing for the public's
ability to utilize the technology when the patent term is
expired. Supreme Court Justice Story succinctly ties this
requirement to the philosophy behind U.S. Patent Law in
an 1813 circuit case:
Harvard/Onco-Mouse; however, the Canadian Supreme Court reversed the
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal and denied patentability of "transgenic
animals" including the HarvardOnco-Mouse. Harvard College v. Canada (2002)
4 S.C.R. 45. For a discussion of the European Patent Office decision, see
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 129-30.
65. See Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309.
66. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2004). In earlier cases dealing with medical
research patents, the courts required a definite utility. See, e.g., Brenner v.
Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) (ruling that a process for making a known steroid
was unpatentable for lack of known utility though a closely related steroid had
shown tumor-inhibiting effects in mice). With the advent of the human genome
project, the PTO published guidelines allowing patents on unknown gene
sequences and other potential research tools of DNA. Utility Examination
Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (July 14, 1995). With an avalanche of patent
applications for expressed sequence tags (small portions of DNA that might be
used as probes) the PTO published new guidelines requiring "substantial"
utility. Revised Interim Utility Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440 (Dec. 21, 1999),
amended after public comment by Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg.
1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
67. There is a lot of discontent with the granting of "frivolous" patents-
particularly, though not solely, evident in some of the patents related to
computers (Amazon's One-Click, for example). Most of this can be traced to
leeway in respect to the nonobviousness requirement for patentability. See
James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 12, 2000, at 44.
Timothy J. Muris, FTC Chairman, recently remarked on the necessity of
narrowing the nonobviousness standard for patents. Timothy J. Muris,
Remarks at the N.Y. State Bar Antitrust Div. Ann. Meeting (January 29,
2004), available at http://www.nysba.org (last visited Mar. 28, 2005). See also
supra note 40.
68. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1975).
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[T]he monopoly is granted upon the express condition, that the
party shall make a full and explicit disclosure, so as to enable the
public, at the expiration of his patent, to make and use the inven-
tion or improvement in as ample and beneficial a manner as the
patentee himself. If ... this cannot be done, it is defrauding the
public of all the consideration, upon which the monopoly is
granted.6 9
II. WAS THERE EXPERIMENTAL USE BEFORE HATCH-
WAXMAN?
A. Early Cases
Unlike fair use-its closest counterpart in U.S.
Copyright Law70 -Patent Law had no statutory exemption
for an experimental use defense before Hatch-Waxman. The
same case used by Justice Story to advocate the necessity of
an enabling disclosure, is credited as the source for the
common law experimental use exception to patent in-
fringement. 71  In Whittemore v. Cutter, Justice Story
remanded for a new trial and noted, "[I]t could never have
been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who
constructed such a machine merely for philosophical
experiments .... "72
This doctrine of experimental use as a defense for pat-
ent infringement was upheld in court dicta of the
nineteenth century and was expounded in a well-respected
treatise on patent law, 73 though it was not found sufficient
in the scattered cases claiming its use. The district judge in
an 1861 case, Poppenhusen v. Falke, declined to find the de-
fense applicable but declared, "It has been .. .now well
settled, that an experiment with a patented article for the
69. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1122 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). See also infra notes 356-59 and accompanying
text.
71. See Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121. See also supra text accompanying
notes 68-69.
72. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121. See also Sawin v. Guild, 21 F.Cas. 554,
555 (1813) (referring to Whittemore).




sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity,
or for mere amusement, is not an infringement." 74
In the twentieth century, the Court of Claims consid-
ered the experimental use defense in a number of cases,
and though each case confirms the existence of an
experimental use defense, 75 only Pitcairn v. United States
sufficiently states the law under which the exemption
should be applied. 76 Pitcairn involves the experimental use
of helicopters manufactured for the United States by the
plaintiffs. Licensed agreements between Plaintiffs and the
United States existed, but the government wanted to
exclude payment for the period during which the helicop-
ters were being "tested."77 The court states:
Tests, demonstrations, and experiments of such nature are
intended uses of the infringing aircraft manufactured for the
defendant and are in keeping with the legitimate business of the
using agency. Experimental use is [therefore] not a defense in the
present litigation.
78
The court reasoned that the testing and evaluation
were part of the defendant's normal course of business and,
therefore, not to be deemed experimental. 79 Compensation
would need to be paid by the government. An experimental
use defense continued to be confirmed by the courts, but
only narrowly construed.80
74. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F.Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861).
75. See Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (U.S.C.C. 1976); Douglas v.
United States, 510 F.2d 364 (U.S.C.C. 1974); Chesterfield v. United States, 159
F. Supp. 371 (U.S.C.C. 1958); Ordnance Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl.
1 (1936). These cases, all binding precedent on the present-day Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, involve litigation against the United States. See also
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
76. Pitcairn, 547 F.2d at 1124-26. See also Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
77. Pitcairn, 547 F.2d at 1125.
78. Id. at 1125-26.




B. Roche v. Bolar
In 1984, Roche Products sued Bolar Pharmaceuticals
for infringement of a patented ingredient in Roche's sleep-
ing pill.81 The CAFC refused to expand the experimental
use doctrine to exempt Bolar's use of the component though
it involved FDA testing.82 Bolar's infringement did not
apply to the judicially created exceptions of "amusement, to
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry,"
but was admittedly for uses related to business and profit.
8 3
Bolar argued, "[E]ven if no established doctrine exists [to]
escape liability for patent infringement, public policy
requires that [the court] create a new exception. ..."84
Bolar's rationale for a new exception was based on the
increased length of time required to complete FDA testing
with the passage of the Drug Amendments of 1962. 85 When
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) was
passed in 1938, it required the filing of a New Drug Appli-
cation (NDA) with the FDA, including information on
safety. If no notification came from the FDA to the pioneer
company within sixty days, marketing could begin.86 With
the amendments to the Act in 1962, an NDA required not
only safety data but proof of efficacy as well, and the FDA
would affirmatively approve the application before mar-
keting could begin.87 The court in Roche noted that seven to
ten years was the average time from application by the
81. Roche, 733 F.2d 858.
82. Id. at 867.
83. Id. at 863 (quoting from Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F.Cas. 1048, 1049
(C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1861)).
84. Id.
85. Drug Amendments of 1962, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 355 (2003)).
86, Fed. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (2004)). Congress had previously passed legislation
regulating food processing, including an act in 1906, but the 1938 statute
greatly expanded FDA authority. FDCA passage resulted because of a public
health disaster with the death of some 100 people taking an adulterated drug
product. See the story at the FDA website, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/
historyoffdalsection2.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
87. See supra note 85.
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pharmaceutical company to FDA approval.88 Therefore,
once a pioneer drug finally received FDA approval, a patent
term of seven years (rather than seventeen) might be all
that remained until expiration. However, the companies
gained another de facto monopoly of two or more years
when their patent expired because it took the generic
manufacturers this long to complete their own FDA
approval. 89 Bolar contended that it was not intended, with
passage of the FDCA, that an increased duration of the mo-
nopoly be given to the pioneer companies; rather the court
should allow experimental use for the generic drug's testing
during the pioneer drug's patent term "so that the public
can enjoy the benefits of competition as soon as possible,
consistent with the need to encourage invention."90 The
court responded negatively to Bolar's suggestion and
"decline[d] the opportunity . . . to engage in legislative ac-
tivity proper only for the Congress."91 Congress accepted
this responsibility, and the passage of Hatch-Waxman
followed. 92
III. HATCH-WAXMAN PROVIDES A NEEDED SAFE HARBOR
A. Congress Acts
In 1984 the U.S. Patent Law and the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act were amended, addressing a seri-
ous need for cheaper and more readily available generic
drugs to a graying population. 93 At the same time, passage
88. Roche, 733 F.2d at 864.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 863-64.
92. Hatch-Waxman, supra note 29. The Hatch-Waxman Act is sometimes
called the Bolar Amendment (particularly overseas) after the case that was a
catalyst to its passage. Legislation was before Congress regarding faster and
more efficient means to market generic drugs at the time of the court's ruling in
Roche. See Roche, 733 F.2d at 865.
93. Hatch Waxman, supra note 29. See also J. Grana, The Aged in America,
in 1 (2) HEALTH AFFAIRS 103 (Spring 1982) (listing increasing percentage of
aged population); Alex Kucherov & Abigail Trafford, Coming: New Kinds of
Drugs that Could Save Your Life, U.S NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 5, 1981, at
55 (addressing the pressure on the FDA for faster drug approval, as well as
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of this Hatch-Waxman Act pacified pharmaceutical
companies holding the patent monopolies on name-brand
drugs. 94 Hatch-Waxman was designed to allow the generic
companies to utilize the prior testing and data that had
been completed by the name-brand (pioneer) companies.
These pioneer companies were then given an extension on
their patent term to compensate for the time taken in ob-
taining the data and clinical testing results. 95
To accomplish these goals, the new legislation
addressed "two unintended distortions of the . . .patent
term produced by the requirement that certain products
must receive premarket regulatory approval. ' 96 As the
court had noted in Roche, at one end of the patent term, a
"distortion" kept drug companies from reaping any profit for
their research and development costs since valuable patent
time was used while waiting for FDA approval. 97 In the
other "distortion" after the expiration of the patent term, a
de facto monopoly was enjoyed by the pioneer company on
its drug while the generic company complied with
requirements for its own FDA approval. 98 The patent exten-
sion portion of Hatch-Waxman, 35 U.S.C. § 156, dealt with
the first "distortion" by giving an extension of the patent
term to the pioneer company, making up for the lack of
profit during its approval process.99 The other portion of
the amendment, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1), addressed the
second "distortion" of the de facto monopolies. 100 The
generic company is exempted from infringement of the
pioneer drug and able to begin the approval process before
reporting on new drugs); Mark Sherman, 9.3% Increase Reported in Costs for
Health Care, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 9, 2004, at A4 (charting the increases in
health costs of the past three decades).
94. See generally Sheila R. Shulman et al., Patent Term Restoration: The
Impact of the Waxman-Hatch Act on New Drugs and Biologics Approved 1984-
1995, 2 (4) J.BIOLAW & Bus 63 (1999).
95. Id. at 64.
96. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990).
97. Id. at 669-70. See also Roche, 733 F.2d at 864.
98. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669-71.
99. Id.
100. See text accompanying infra note 113 for 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) creates the act of artificial infringement through the filing of
an ANDA for a generic drug; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(4) prescribes the remedies for
an act of infringement created in (2). See also 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
20051 367
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the pioneer patent term is expired. 101 In addition, the
generic company actually uses the original data submitted
by the pioneer company, needing only studies showing
bioequivalence to the pioneer drug. 0 2 The generic product
is on the market immediately upon expiration of the pioneer
drug's patent term, and the public is benefited by the lower
prices of generic brands that did not incur the same
expenses of research and development as the pioneer
drugs.103
A generic company desiring to utilize the data provided
to the FDA by the pioneer company, files an Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA) including the evidence of
bioequivalence.10 4 The ANDA filing must also include
certification in regard to the status of all patents related to
the original pioneer company's drug.10 5 The four possible
options in regard to this certification are: (1) "that such pat-
ent information has not been filed," (2) "that such patent
has expired," (3) "the date on which such patent will
expire," or (4) "that such patent is invalid (and, therefore,
the generic drug will not be infringing)."'106 Upon notice of a
Paragraph IV certification, that the generic drug will not be
infringing the pioneer's patent because the patent is inva-
lid, the pioneer company must be notified and then has a
limited time to file an infringement suit against the generic
company. (Under the first three paragraph certifications, no
infringement is filed as the generic company is exempted,
and marketing will not begin until the pioneer patent's
expiration.)
B. Litigation Follows Hatch- Waxman's Passage
Inevitably, litigation followed the passage of Hatch-
Waxman as, in some cases, the makers of generic drugs
may have felt that they had little to lose in respect to filing




105. Id. at 64.
106. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2)(A), 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii) (2000).
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a Paragraph IV certification. 10 7 The court might rule in
their favor by declaring the pioneer patent invalid, and
then the generic brand (minus the research and develop-
ment costs) could be placed on the market much sooner.
Abuses were also inevitable as pioneer companies made
minor variations in a drug component (dose, size, or color)
to obtain a new patent and renew their monopoly on the
market. 08
Pioneer and generic companies also made deals to keep
the cheaper brand off the market, which resulted in the
filing of anti-trust suits against some large pharmaceutical
entities. 10 9 Hatch-Waxman was amended to close some of
these loopholes," 0 ) and special intellectual property guide-
lines by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) developed in
direct response to some of the anti-competitive license
agreements between generic and pioneer drug compa-
nies."'
107. See, e.g., Ben Venue Lab., Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d
446 (1998).
108. See FTC Rep., supra note 40, ch. 3, at 12-13; Health Registration Data
Exclusivity, Biomedical Research, and Restrictions on the Introduction of
Generic Drugs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human
Services and Education and Related Agencies, Comm. on Appropriations, U.S.
Senate (1997) (statement of James P. Love, Consumer Project on Technology),
at http://www.cptech.org/pharm/senhregd.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). See
also Gardiner Harris, Research Company Receives 2 Patents, Could Delay
Generic Forms of Prilosec, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2001, at B5; Sheryl Gay
Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, How Companies Stall Generics and Keep Themselves
Healthy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, at 1; infra notes 368-70 and accompanying
text.
109. See infra notes 368-70 and accompanying text.
110. Hatch-Waxman was amended in the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2448-63
(amending 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2003)). But see Sarah M. Yoho, Comment,
Reformation of the Hatch-Waxman Act, an Unnecessary Resolution, 27 NOVA L.
REV. 527 (2003); Congressman Henry Waxman, Address at the Center for
Business Intelligence's Generic Drug Conference (Nov. 29, 2001) (noting that
though consumers had paid for abuses of Hatch-Waxman with higher drug
prices, amendments might further disrupt the balance necessary to maintain
availability of generics with pioneer research), summary at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail]ip.health/2001-December/002534.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2005).
111. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (April 6,
1995), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13, 132 (1995).
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Litigation resulted not only from the infringement
created by the filing of an ANDA under § 271(e)(2), the Act's
conditions for establishing an "artificial infringement" with
one of four possible certifications, but litigation also arose
as a result of the safe harbor provision of § 271(e)(1).
112
This section of Hatch-Waxman states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or
sell ... a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or
veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4,
1913) . .. ) solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.
11 3
Not surprisingly, the language of § 271(e)(1) has come
under scrutiny in litigation. 114 The courts have particularly
analyzed the phrases "solely for uses reasonably related to
the development" and "under a Federal law. 11 5 Early after
Hatch-Waxman's passage, "solely for uses" was interpreted
narrowly, allowing exemption only for activities directly in-
volved in seeking FDA approval. 1 6 Later the emphasis
moved from "solely for uses" to "reasonably related." 117 In
its 1997 Abtox decision, the CAFC interpreted the language
of the statute ("solely for uses reasonably related to") to
mean that the "uses" of the infringing behavior needed only
be "reasonably related to" FDA approval, not "solely related
to" FDA approval. 18 Hatch-Waxman would expand, giving
safe harbor from patent infringement for trade shows,
demonstrations, and recruitment since these activities
could be "reasonably related" to development for eventual
FDA approval.119
112. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003).
114. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670-71 (1990).
115. Id. at 666-69.
116. See, e.g., Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F.
Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
117. See supra text accompanying note 113.




In addition to broadening the boundaries of allowed
activities under Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor, the courts
would expand the eligibility of products given an exemp-
tion. The phrase "under a Federal Act" would be interpreted
to include, not just drugs and devices under the lengthy
FDA approval process, but any product developed under
federal guidelines. 120
Besides the language of the Act, the intent of Congress
would be pertinent in the courts' interpretation of Hatch-
Waxman's safe harbor. Hatch-Waxman was initially
perceived to have provided only for those patented inven-
tions that were affected by both sections of the Act-both
the regulatory FDA process that extended into the initial
patent term (before marketing could begin) and the possi-
bility of de facto monopolies at the end of the term (before
generic companies could complete FDA approval). 121 The
courts, however, would eliminate this qualification, as
devices not affected by the lengthy FDA approval process
would also be granted safe harbor.122 Even biotech tools
eventually made successful attempts to navigate into safe
harbor. 123
What was the reason for the enlarged boundaries and
scope of Hatch-Waxman? With the courts' narrow interpre-
tation of the experimental use exception, 124 Hatch-Waxman
provided the only safe harbor for the rapidly changing bio-
tech field, aid companies sought its protection well
upstream from the FDA approval process. 125 Expanded
interpretation of Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor filled a
chasm, particularly noticeable in U.S. Patent Law where-
unlike the rest of the industrialized world-no patent
exemption exists for medical-related research. 126
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666
F.Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 148-52.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 178-205.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 70-92.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 178-205.
126. See Thiru Balasubramaniam & Andrew Goldman, Selected Compulsory
Licensing, Governmental Use, and Patent Exceptions Provisions in Various
Countries, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/examples2.html (last visited
Feb. 8, 2005). See also infra text accompanying notes 374-77.
2005]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
IV. SAFE HARBOR EXPANDED
A. An Early Case
The courts did not initially use Hatch Waxman's safe
harbor to fill the need for an exemption for biotech tools. An
example of the courts' initial reluctance to expand the
exemption of § 271(e)(1) is demonstrated in the 1987
district court decision, Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech. 127 The court refused to grant safe
harbor to Genentech for its infringement of the purified
Factor VIII:C owned by Scripps. 128 The patents owned by
Scripps included the purified form of human Factor VIII:C,
a necessary clotting agent in human blood. 129 There was an
obvious advantage and public need to produce a recombi-
nant form of Factor VIII:C that could be used to treat
hemophilia without the danger of transmitting HIV and
other viruses. 130 The broad claims allowed in Scripps
Clinic's patents is an example of a recurring problem in the
biotech field whereby early biotech inventions are granted
broad patents that prevent further development in the
field.131
Not only was the scope of Scripps's Factor VIII:C broad,
but the subject, a component of human blood, would not
have been considered patentable subject matter prior to an
earlier decision. 132 In Parke-Davis, Judge Learned Hand
ruled that a purified form of natural adrenaline could be
the subject of a patent. 33 In nineteenth century decisions,
the courts, including the Supreme Court, had consistently
ruled that products of nature were non-patentable, but




130. See infra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
131. See generally FTC Rep. supra note 40; Merges & Nelson, supra note
39.
132. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.N.Y. 1911),
affid in part, rev'd in part by 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).




Judge Hand found precedent in two cases (including one
sustaining a patent for aspirin) to support his ruling. 134 The
PTO and courts have followed Hand's decision-human
components are patentable. With the explosion of biotech-
nology on the scene in the mid-twentieth century--one of
the biotech advances was the development of recombinant
forms of DNA, allowing for the production of Factor
VIII:C.135
The Genentech court narrowly interpreted Hatch-
Waxman's phrase, "solely for," to mean only activities
involved in FDA approval, not just "reasonably related to
FDA testing."' 36 The court insisted that Genentech's
commercial purpose and actions "clearly lie beyond the
protection of § 271(e)(1)" as evidenced both by the statutory
language and by the intent of Congress.' 37 Interestingly,
the district court not only found infringement of claims
relating to the purity of Factor VIII:C that the recombinant
form literally infringed, but also found infringement in a
claim that related to the "product of a process.' 38 The
recombinant form was not produced without first using a
purified form to obtain the necessary sequence, and the
process by which this was initially determined was also
patented by Scripps. 139 This was, by a broad definition, a
research tool in that the component (purified Factor VIII:C)
was first infringed to make recombinant Factor VIII:C
(which then infringed another claim of the patent-the
actual product).140
In this decision, the court ruled that infringement had
occurred, but refused to enjoin Genentech from continuing
with development because of the importance of recombinant
134. Id. at 103. The Kuehmsted case cited by Hand refers to a patent for
acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin)-the natural form originating from the bark of the
willow tree. Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701 (7t
h Cir.
1910). See also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 101-04 (discussing the law
before and after Parke-Davis).
135. See infra notes 292-94.
136. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp.
1379, 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1387-88.
139. Id. at 1388.
140. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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forms in treating hemophilia. 141 On appeal in 1991 the
CAFC remanded to the district court for consideration of
the validity of the Scripps patent; the case, however, was
settled before the district court reached a decision on
remand. 142 It is noteworthy that the importance of the
discovery for the public was recognized and, in essence, an
exception was made by the district court early in the period
following passage of Hatch-Waxman by not imposing an
injunction. 143 Though not comfortable in expanding Hatch-
Waxman's safe harbor, on appeal the CAFC also recom-
mended an unusual defense, recognizing the obvious benefit
to the public for the recombinant form. 44
B. Supreme Court and CAFC Expansion
It would take expansion of the safe harbor by higher
courts before actual biotech tools were openly granted an
exemption under § 271(e)(1), the safe harbor provision of
Hatch-Waxman. With a broadening of the Act's scope by a
1990 Supreme Court decision, district courts and the CAFC
soon followed. In Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, the Court faced the
issue of whether medical devices would be included in the
non-infringement exemption. 145 Since the lengthy FDA
approval process addressed by the portion of Hatch-
Waxman providing an extension in patent term also affects
Class III medical devices, the Court determined that the
safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) should also be applied. 146 Other-
wise, a patentee could receive the benefit of patent term ex-
tension without being disadvantaged by the infringement
exemption given to competitors (§ 271(e)(1)). Justice Scalia,
writing the majority opinion, noted that "under Federal
141. Scripps Clinic, 666 F. Supp. at 1401.
142. See Genentech, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 927 F.2d 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (remanding the case to trial for consideration of patent
validity). See also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 997.
143. Scripps Clinic, 666 F. Supp. at 1401.
144. See Genentech v. Scripps, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also text
accompanying infra notes 312-23.
145. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670-71 (1990).
146. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002), with Fed. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act
§ 515 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355) (2003) (governing premarket
approval of new drugs), and 21 U.S.C. § 360 (governing premarket approval of
medical devices) (2004). See also Lilly, 496 U.S. at 667.
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law" denotes the entire scheme of the FDA's regulation
duties, not just drugs.
147
In 1993 and 1997, the CAFC ensured the continued
expansion of the exemption by granting safe harbor to all
medical devices, not just Class III devices. 148 A cardiac defi-
brillator had been the Class III device at issue in the
Court's expansion of Hatch-Waxman in Lilly. 149 Now Class
I and II medical devices would also receive the benefit of an
infringement defense before competitors' patents had
expired, even though no lengthy FDA approval process is
needed for Class I and II devices such as sterilizers and
sanitary gloves. 150 In the Abtox v. Exitron decision, as well
as earlier in Chartex v. MD. Personal Products, the CAFC
ruled that the Supreme Court's "broader holding" in Lilly
was not dependent on the relationship between the patent
term extension (§ 156 for pioneers) with the exemption for
infringement related to FDA approval (§ 271 for generics).
Rather the "entire statutory scheme of [Hatch-Waxman]"
was to be considered.' 5' The court states, "In other words,
the Supreme Court commands that statutory symmetry is
preferable but not required."'15 2
Influenced by these rulings, a district court vacated its
original 1991 decision that had not allowed a safe harbor
for infringement of a non-Class III medical device. 153 It was
no longer necessary for both portions of Hatch-Waxman,
one giving the generic company an early start at the end of
the pioneer's patent term and one supplying the pioneer
company a patent extension, to be relevant for safe harbor
147. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 666-67.
148. Medical devices under classification by the FDA fall into one of three
classes based on the element of risk involved to the public with the device's use.
Only Class III devices (the highest risk) are under the same lengthy FDA
approval process as prescription drugs. See FDA website, supra note 11.
149. Lilly, 496 U.S. at 661.
150. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Chartex
Int'l v. MD. Personal Products Corp., 5 F.3d 1505 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished
table decision).
151. Abtox, 122 F.3d at 1028.
152. Id. at 1029.




to be granted. 154
In 1993 the CAFC ruled in Intermedics v. Ventritex that
all of the infringing activities of Ventritex could be "rea-
sonably related" to obtaining FDA approval for its implant-
able cardiac defibrillator, including the data from its foreign
sales and its U.S. trade shows even though premarket
approval had not yet been obtained from the FDA. 155 The
court notes that the Supreme Court in Lilly rejected the
argument that an infringer should not be able to develop
potential markets if engaged in infringing activities "rea-
sonably related" to FDA approval. 156 The Intermedics deci-
sion also specifically refutes that the intention of Congress
was to limit the safe harbor to clinical trials shortly before
an original patent's expiration. 157  The court states,
"Congress specifically rejected an amendment to the Act
that would have permitted testing only during the last year
of any patent term."' 58 Later in its 1997 Abtox decision, the
CAFC interpreted the language of the statute ("solely for
uses reasonably related to") to mean that the "uses" of the
infringing behavior needed only be "reasonably related to"
FDA approval, not "solely related to" FDA approval.159
C. The District Courts Follow
District court decisions generally followed the expan-
sion of the CAFC and the Supreme Court, though in 1996
the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts declined to
extend the safe harbor exemption in Biogen v. Schering.1
60
The court distinguished its opinion by noting that Biogen
had shipped actual samples of interferon-beta overseas in
preparation for marketing and ruled that such large-scale
154. See supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
155. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., Inc., 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(unpublished table opinion), cert denied, 513 U.S. 876 (1994).
156. Though a careful reading of Lilly failed to substantiate this claim other
than that the Appeal Court's note on economic loss was quoted by the Court.
157. Intermedics, 991 F. Supp. at 810.
158. Id.
159. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
160. Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG, 954 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1996).
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production and market preparation removed it from the
safe harbor exemption. 161
In 1998, however, this same Massachusetts district
court followed the higher courts' lead with a broad interpre-
tation of Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor in Amgen v.
Hoechst.162 The opinion stated, "[The statute's] phrase
'solely for uses reasonably related' is not equivalent to the
phrase 'use is solely for purposes reasonably related.' '
163
Amgen held a patent on recombinant erythropoietin (EPO)
and claimed Hoechst's activities were far more extensive
than those necessary for FDA approval considering the
length of the patent term remaining on Amgen's EPO
patent. 164 In this decision the court followed the higher
courts' broad interpretations and examined whether any
possible infringing activities might "bear reasonable pros-
pects of yielding information that might be relevant in the
FDA approval process. ' 165 If so, the conduct would come
under the safe harbor provision. Hoechst's infringement of
recombinant erythropoietin is ruled exempt. 66
A further expansion of the § 271(e)(1) exemption was
applied in 2002 when the U.S. District Court for Delaware
ruled that an infringer could continue to sell a product after
FDA approval was received. 167 In Wesley Jessen v. Bausch
& Lomb, the court allowed Bausch & Lomb to continue in
the safe harbor though Jessen's patent on an extended-wear
contact lens had not yet expired. Bausch & Lomb claimed
that the safe harbor exemption was still necessary since the
FDA had requested follow-up data. 168 The court followed
161. Id. at 396-97.
162. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.
Mass. 1998).
163. Id. at 107.
164. Id. Erythropoietin is the hormone that stimulants red blood cell
production.
165. Id. at 108.
166. Id.
167. Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.
Del. 2002).
168. Id. at 372
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the broad interpretation of the Act and granted a safe
harbor to Bausch & Lomb's infringing use.1
69
One of the only district court cases not following the
expansive rulings of the higher courts is an earlier decision
by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin, in its 1999 Infigen v. Advanced Cell Technology
(ACT) ruling. 170 The court rejected ACT's claimed safe
harbor exemption for the use of Infigen's patented process
of activating unfertilized bovine eggs.1 71 The court's opinion,
however, may misread the ruling of Lilly. 172 Judge Crabb
asserts that symmetry between the safe harbor for in-
fringement in § 271(e)(1) and the pioneer patent term
extension of § 156 is required for the exemption. 173 The
opinion further notes, "Defendants have cited no cases that
support their reading of § 271(e)(1) as applying [to a prod-
uct not] identified in § 156," and goes on to state, 'My own
research shows no [such] cases."'1 74 This is not the best
reading of the earlier CAFC Abtox ruling that Judge Crabb
cites, 175 nor does it recognize the broad holding of Lilly. 176
Considering these discrepancies, Infigen may not be the
best decision to cite for a judicial example of a refusal to
expand Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor to research tools. 177
The interpretation of Hatch-Waxman by the higher
courts had evolved from granting an exemption only for a
169. Id. at 375.
170. Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech. Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D.
Wisc. 1999).
171. The patent at issue is a process for fertilizing bovine eggs to produce
embryos without the addition of sperm-in essence, the potential of cloning
COWS.
172. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
173. Infigen, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
174. Id.
175. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
176. Compare Infigen, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (noting that Defendant's
products, though under potential FDA regulation, are not subject to premarket
approval), with Abtox, 122 F.3d at 1029 (noting that the Supreme Court's
"broader holding" in Lilly allows for devices not under rigid FDA premarket
approval). See also Lilly, 496 U.S. at 666-67 (emphasizing the entire scheme of
"by Federal law" for the Hatch-Waxman exemption).
177. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 2001 WL
1512597 (S.D.N.Y.) at 5 (stating that the Infigen court misread the Abtox case).
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drug undergoing FDA approval, to the provision of safe
harbor for almost any product or activity that could claim to
be upstream from FDA approval. The gate was opening for
biotech tools to navigate into a safe harbor exemption.
D. Biotech Tools Granted Safe Harbor
In 2001, a district court upheld an exemption for the
infringement of patented taxane derivatives being used in
the development of potential taxol analogues. 178 Taxol, a
drug used for breast cancer and other malignancies, was
originally derived from natural sources. 179 Synthetic ver-
sions have since been developed with taxane derivatives
being the intermediates obtained before the final synthetic
form. 8 0 Though not strictly biotech tools under all defini-
tions, patented derivatives are similar to research tools that
block further patents unless licenses are obtained.' 8 ' With
this new exemption for infringement of the patented deriva-
tives, safe harbor was granted for a product that was not
itself the subject of FDA approval. Research tools would be
next in line to utilize the exemption. 8 2
Another 2001 case, Nexell v. Amcell, illustrates both the
search for a safe harbor and some of the problems that
occur with licensing of biotech tools. 8 3 FDA approval was
pending for Amcell's stem cell separator, and safe harbor
178. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 2001 WL
1512597 (S.D.N.Y.), affid by other grounds, 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003). On
appeal to the CAFC, Rhone-Poulenc's taxol patents were invalidated due to
nondisclosure to the Patent and Trademark Office.
179. See Mike Miller, Taxanes and Platinum Drugs in Cancer Treatment, 2
(12) BENCHMARKS, Dec. 30, 2002, at 2, Nat'l Cancer Inst., available at
http://www.cancer.gov/newscenter/benchmarks (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
Taxol's original source was from the Pacific Northwest yew tree. See the story of
its discovery at Nat'l Res. Canada, at http://www.pfc.forestry.caecologyl
yew/taxole.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
180. Taxanes can also now be classified and used as treatment drugs in
themselves. See Miller, supra note 179.
181. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
182. See Brian D. Coggio & F. Dominic Cerrito, The Safe Harbor Provision
of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Present Scope, New Possibilities, and International
Considerations, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 161, 169 (2002).
183. Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Amcell Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Del.
2001), amended by 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Del. 2002).
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was claimed for the use of Nexell's patented monoclonal
antibody, a biotech tool necessary for utilization of the stem
cell device. 184 The stem cell separator is used with stem cell
transplants for numerous diseases and conditions including
leukemia, lymphoma, breast cancer, and lupus. 185 In an
autologous stem cell transplant the patient's own stem cells
(undifferentiated cells that have the potential of becoming
red blood cells, white blood cells or platelets) can be selected
by the separator (undifferentiated stem cells are believed to
be free of malignancy) and these good stem cells replaced
back in the patient after treating the marrow to destroy the
malignant cells. 186 The separator has the job of selecting or
separating the good stem cells and does so with the assis-
tance of the monoclonal antibodies that stick to the desired
stem cells. Nexell had acquired the rights to these particu-
lar antibodies and granted a license to Amcell for their use
in Amcell's stem cell separator. 187 Nexell and Amcell were
in competition with each other; Nexell had its own stem cell
separator that was already FDA approved and, due to a
different means of selection, was not being infringed by
Amcell's separator. 188 Nexell claimed that Amcell's activi-
ties of physician/hospital recruitment, as well as promo-
tional trade shows and publications, were uses beyond
those necessary for FDA approval. 189 Its monoclonal
antibodies, Nexell asserted, were being infringed.190 The
district court's initial decision focused on the activities for
approval of the cell separator and took the unusual course
of deferring to the FDA for a decision on whether the activi-
ties were "reasonably related" to FDA approval (though it
184. Id. See also infra notes 300-04 and accompanying text.
185. See, e,g,, Federico Silvestri et al., Positive Selection of CD34+ Cells: A
Short Review of the Immunoadsorption Methods Currently Available for
Experimental and Clinical Use, 2 J. OF HEMATOTHERAPY 473 (1993).
186. Id.
187. Nexell holds the license for the patented monoclonal antibodies from
Becton Dickinson who purchased the rights from Johns Hopkins University
where they were invented by a researcher/physician.
188. Nexell, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 408-09.




was the monoclonal antibodies at issue for infringement,
not the stem cell separator).191
It is worth noting that these same antibodies had been
the subject of previous litigation in the same court with the
same judge. 192 In this prior case a biotech company was
litigated out of business by Nexell's predecessors-Baxter
Healthcare, Becton-Dickinson, and Johns Hopkins
University.193 Though CellPro's stem cell separator had
passed FDA approval and been used by 5000 patients in
300 institutions, the start-up biotech company was found
guilty of infringement of the monoclonal antibodies
patented by Johns Hopkins. 94 CellPro had negotiated with
its competitor, Baxter/Johns Hopkins, regarding licensing
of the antibodies but felt that the licensing fee was too high
considering CellPro's advanced competitive position in stem
cell technology. 95 In addition, CellPro decided that their
own monoclonal antibodies were not infringing given that
in the biotech arena it was understood the two sets of anti-
bodies were distinct from each other. 96 This reasoning
would be fatal as Judge McKelvie overturned the first jury's
verdict, which was in CellPro's favor, and ordered a new
trial. 197
191. Id. at 423.
192. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303 (D. Del. 1996), 978 F.
Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1997), affd in part, vacated in part by 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
193. Id. See also Tyrone Beason, Suit-Ravaged CelPro Declares
Bankruptcy, SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at C1.
194. See Avital Bar-Shalom & Robert Cook-Deegan, Patents and Innovation
in Cancer Therapeutics: Lessons from CellPro in 80 (4) MILLBANK Q. 637, 652-
53 (Dec. 2002).
195. RICK MURDOCK & DAVID FISHER, PATIENT NUMBER ONE 48-52, 252
(2000).
196. See Bar-Shalom & Cook-Deegan, supra note 194, at 657 (suggesting the
scope of Johns Hopkins's patents was too broad). See also generally Merges &
Nelson, supra note 39 (discussing the problem with broad patents granted in
pioneer areas of biotechnology).
197. Judge McKelvie overturned and granted a new trial on the basis of a
new ruling by the Supreme Court, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370 (1996), finding claim construction in patents to be a matter of law. The
first trial's jury had found that Johns Hopkins's claims were not infringed by
CellPro; Judge McKelvie ordered a second trial and said that there was
infringement. See MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 195, at 268-69.
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Judge McKelvie's unusual deferral to the FDA in the
first Nexell decision may have been influenced by the
enormous negative publicity that surrounded his 1997
CelPro ruling, including his punitive judgment that sent
CellPro into bankruptcy. 198 In the original 2002 Nexell deci-
sion, Judge McKelvie granted summary judgment to
Amcell, but this decision would then need "clarification"
when Nexell queried the FDA as to which of Amcell's activi-
ties could be deemed exempted by Hatch-Waxman. 199 The
FDA declined the responsibility for determining which prior
activities might be "reasonably related" to potential FDA
approval. 200 The amended decision states that Amcell's
activities related to FDA trials are exempt under Hatch-
Waxman's safe harbor, 201 but those activities not related to
FDA trials can be litigated in respect to licensing viola-
tions. 202 Which activities are not related to FDA approval is
not clarified.20 3 The court tries to evade the question on
research tools by equating the stem cell separator with the
monoclonal antibodies as one invention, a medical device
exempt under Hatch-Waxman. 204  Nonetheless Judge
McKelvie's opinion has been interpreted to expand the Act's
provision to include research tools, and it does grant safe
198. See, e.g., Bill Richards, Cancer Fighters: How a Corporate Feud Doomed
Human Trials of Promising Therapy, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1999, at Al; see also
Beason, supra note 193; MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 195, at 259-60.
199. Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Amcell Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Del.
2001), amended by 199 F. Supp. 2d 197, 201 (D. Del. 2002). See also text
accompanying supra note 191.
200. Nexell, 199 F. Supp. at 205.
201. Id.
202. Nexell, 199 F. Supp. at 207. The opinion does not deal with the
licensing issue. Nexell claimed that Amcell violated the license for use of the
monoclonal antibodies since the agreement expressly excluded "research
dedicated to a therapeutic in vivo use" and though Amcell might be using the
patented antibodies only for in vitro (test tube) use, the "research [is] dedicated
to in vivo [in the body] use" and should therefore be excluded. Judge McKelvie
states that the licensing issue is yet to be resolved though it appears to be key
to the entire issue. Id at 206.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 206. The opinion calls the separator an "allegedly infringing
device" but it is the monoclonal antibodies that are infringed, not the medical
device seeking FDA approval.
382 [Vol. 53
COMPULSORY LICENSING
harbor to a patented biotech tool, the monoclonal antibod-
ies.205
E. Integra v. Merck
The tide of expansion was stemmed in 2003 when the
CAFC declined to extend safe harbor to a research tool in
Integra v. Merck.20 6 The court reexamines the issues of con-
gressional intent and statutory language, forming different
opinions from those reached in prior decisions.207 For exam-
ple, the court emphasizes that the House Committee pro-
posing the Hatch-Waxman Act intended that the infringe-
ment upon a patent holder's rights would be "de minimis"
rather than "substantial. ' 20 8 The court also examines the
language of the statute and, though conceding that the
term "reasonably" allows for some experiments outside of
those needed for FDA approval, states, "The exemption ...
does not endorse an interpretation of § 271(e)(1) that would
encompass drug development activities far beyond those
necessary to acquire information for FDA approval .... -209
The court, therefore, refuses to extend the "reach of the rea-
sonable relationship test" to biotech tools like the short pro-
tein peptide patented by Integra. 210 Merck, though discover-
ing a valuable use for the peptide sequence in identifying
potential cancer drugs, is not exempt from infringement. 211
This establishes a definite break in the trend of expan-
sion that started with the Supreme Court in Lilly (need not
be a generic drug) to the CAFC's decisions in Intermedics
205. See William L. Warren et al., Experimental Uses and Research Tool
Licensing Alternatives, presented at the Biotechnology Georgia ICLE (April
2003), available at http://www.sablaw.com/files/tbl-s47Details%5CfileUpload
265%5C2552%5CExperimentalUsesResearchToolLicensing.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2005). See also generally Coggio & Cerrito, supra note 182.
206. Integra Lifesciences I, LTD. v. Merck KgaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir.
2003), cert granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005). See also text accompanying supra
notes 16-33. Will the Supreme Court seal the hole in the dike temporarily
plugged by the CAFC, or open the floodgates? See infra note 397.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 865 (quoting from H.R.Rep. No. 857, at 8).
209. Id. at 867. See also supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
210. Id. at 866. See also supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
211. Integra, 331 F.3d at 872. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
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(activities need only be reasonably related to potential FDA
approval) and Abtox (any patented product under FDA
regulation can be exempt), and continued on through a dis-
trict court's opinion in Nexell (research tools not seeking
FDA approval can be exempted).
212
The courts have come full circle back to the decision in
the early case discussed, Genentech.213  In that case,
Genentech had already produced recombinant Factor
VIII:C, infringing Scripps's patent of the purified form.
214
The district court, though ruling against an exemption for
Genentech under Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor, refused to
grant an injunction because of the potentially enormous
benefit for the treatment of hemophilia with a recombinant
form rather than with Factor VIII extracted from human
blood. 215 On appeal, the CAFC then found a potential way
to get around Scripps's broad pioneer patent. Now, in
Integra, the CAFC refuses to extend the safe harbor provi-
sion to Merck's activities, but also remands for reconsidera-
tion of the high royalties assessed by the lower court for
Merck's use of the peptide.21 6 Still the court opines that to
offer exemption for the downstream development of poten-
tial drugs "would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of
patentees owning biotechnology tool patents."21 7 Justice
Newman offers a spirited dissent in Integra, bemoaning the
demise of the common law experimental exemption and dis-
tinguishing between research "tools" and the peptide "com-
position" at issue.21
8
212. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669-71 (1990);
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., Inc., 991 F. 2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Abtox,
Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F. 3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Nexell Therapeutics, Inc.
v. Amcell Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 407 (Del. 2001), amended by 199 F.Supp.2d
197 (Del. 2002).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 127-42.
214. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. V. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp.
1379, 1388 (N.D. Cal. 1987). See also supra text accompanying notes 127-42.
215. Id. at 1404. See also supra text accompanying notes 127-42.
216. Integra, 331 F.3d at 872. Integra was originally awarded $15,000,000
in damages and fees, but the CAFC remanded for a smaller award.
217. Id. at 867.
218. Id. at 878.
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Royalties without punitive damages are really a de
facto compulsory license. 219 Unlike the ruling in CellPro
where total damages of $15.6 million were upheld, the
CAFC in Integra reversed the lower court's $15 million fees
and damage award against Merck, and remanded for con-
sideration of a more reasonable award. 220 It is the courts
deciding which biotech tools are exempt, which infringers
will be the benefactors of de facto compulsory licensing, and
which biotech companies will stay in business. A better so-
lution is needed.
V. Is THERE EXPERIMENTAL USE AFTER HATCH-WAXMAN?
A. Roche and Pre-Madey
With an experimental use defense effectively cut off
from the medical research field after Roche, it was a natural
outcome for companies to test the judicial waters around
Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor. Few examples exist of an ex-
perimental use defense being claimed in the two decades
following passage of Hatch-Waxman, prior to Madey v.
Duke.
In one of the handful of cases, the defense tries to get
the court to broaden the criteria for the experimental use
exemption. 221 In 1990 the defendant's attorney in Deute-
rium Corp. v. United States argued for the establishment of
a defense of experimental use, with criteria that are re-
served by the PTO and courts in determining whether a
first party's use is experimental. 222 An inventor's own, first
party, use of his invention prior to patent application bars
the right to a patent if the invention has been in public use
for over one year, unless that use is for the perfecting of the
invention. 223 In that case the inventor's own use is experi-
219. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chems.,773 F.2d 1230, 1233 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (noting that when injunctions are not granted "infringers could become
compulsory licensees").
220. Integra, 331 F.3d at 872. See also MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 195,
at 246.
221. Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 624 (1990).
222. Id. at 632.
223. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 558-59, 575-82.
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mental and does not prevent a patent from being granted. 224
The Deuterium court found the first party experimental use
criteria inapplicable to the common law experimental use
defense for third party infringement.
225
Interestingly, the Deuterium court did not emphasize a
commercial purpose in its rejection of the defense, as did
the CAFC in Roche; rather the court cited precedent and
ruled that if the infringing use was related to the regular
business conducted by a company, it could not be experi-
mental. 226 This is the same emphasis and precedent
followed by the CAFC in Madey. The experimental use de-
fense was not rejected because Duke University's use of the
laser gun had been proven to be a commercial venture, but
rather because research tools were part of Duke
University's regular business.
227
Research tools were not the issue in Deuterium, but
rather the issue was government licensing of patented
items-typical of many of the pre-Hatch-Waxman experi-
mental use cases. In a 1998 district court case, research
tools are the issue.228 In Giese v. Pierce Chemical Co., the
patents cover a method for detection of cancer cells. 229 The
defendants are charged with contributory infringement be-
cause the kits they sell, containing chemical reagents, will
be utilized by purchasers using the patented method. 230 The
defendants correctly assert that there can be no contribu-
tory infringement without direct infringement. 231 Since
many of the purchasers of the kits are universities con-
ducting research that is exempt from infringement under
experimental use-with no direct infringement by these
universities, there is no contributory infringement, main-
tains Pierce. 232 The district court states, "Roche established
a restrictive definition of the traditional common law doc-
224. Id. at 586-91.
225. Deuterium, 19 C1.Ct. at 632.
226. Id at 631-32.
227. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
228. Giese v. Pierce Chem. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D. Mass. 1998).






trine, but in no way eliminated it. ' 233 The court does not
evaluate whether the research conducted by purchasers of
the kits qualifies as experimental use, noting that there is
no agreement on what proportion of the kits were sold to
academic researchers.234 The implication of the court's dicta
is that the use of the kits by university researchers is ex-
empt from infringement though no determination is possi-
ble for a summary judgment on this claim.235
In 2000 the CAFC upheld a lower court's ruling in
Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp. (SEC) that found
tests performed by defendants' scientists, attempting to de-
sign around the method patent licensed by Embrex, were
not defensible as experimental use.236 To design around a
claim from a patented invention is not illegal; it is a
common means in industry for developing competitive tech-
nology and products.237 In many cases, particularly when a
technology is not the pioneer in a field, the PTO rejects
broad patent claims that would prevent designing around
by competitors. 238 Embrex was the exclusive licensee of a
government-patented technology for inoculating birds from
disease while still in the egg.239 The patented claim for the
inoculation method was not so broad as to cover injection
anywhere into the egg; rather the vaccine was to be injected
into either the amnion or the yolk sac.240 The design around
by SEC attempted to inoculate into a different part of the
egg that would not infringe the patented method. SEC was
not successful, accidentally hitting an area of egg claimed in
233. Id. at 36.
234. Id. at 35.
235. Id. at 37.
236. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
237. See FTC Rep., supra note 40, ch. 3, at 10 (noting the rise in innovation
by designing around patents). See also Designing Around' Valid U.S. Patents, a
course offered by Patent Resources Group, April 2005. Course syllabus, at
http://www.patentresources.com (last visited March 5, 2005).
238. There is no mention of prosecutorial history estoppel (PHE) in the case,
but it would be interesting to know whether the original application to the PTO
had tried to claim injection into any area of the egg, with that claim being
rejected by the PTO as too broad (with a more narrow claim of injection only
into the amnion or yolk sac then allowed). Since literal infringement occurred,
PHE is not specifically applicable.




Embrex's patent.241 It is important to note that it was not
SEC's unsuccessful attempt to produce and sell injection
machines that was found to be infringing.242 The infringe-
ment was in hitting the area of the egg claimed in the
patent application and, though it was an accidental
infringement while experimenting, no defense was
available. 243
Since SEC had a commercial motive for attempting to
design around the inoculation method, the court did not
need to apply the Pitcairn standard, also used by the dis-
trict court in Deuterium, that disallowed an experimental
use defense if the activity was part of an entity's normal
business. 244 The Embrex court instead cites a commercial
motive and notes the Roche opinion which would not "con-
strue the experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a
violation of the patent laws in the guise of 'scientific
inquiry,' when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not
insubstantial commercial purposes. ''245
B. Madey v. Duke
In 2002 a district court decision in Madey v. Duke
University was overturned as the CAFC denied the school
an experimental use exemption for a patent used under a
federal research grant.246 In June of 2003 the Supreme
Court denied certiorari; the CAFC decision against Duke
University, for its use of the patented free electron laser
technology, stands.247
241. Id. at 1347.
242. Id. at 1352.
243. Id. at 1353. Interestingly, a concurring opinion in Embrex argues that
since the Supreme Court has removed the issue of intent from patent
infringement, no experimental use exemption exists. See Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997) (stating that proof of intent is
unnecessary to determine literal infringement).
244. See supra text accompanying note 226.
245. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(quoting Roche Prods. Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).





John Madey, the research professor holding the patents
on the highly regarded laser technology, was removed as di-
rector of the Free Electron Laser Laboratory at Duke
University, resulting in his resignation from the university
in 1998.248 Duke continued to operate some of the equip-
ment in the lab that had been originally developed by
Madey while he was a professor at Stanford University in
the 1980s. 249 Madey sued Duke for infringement and
though the district court decision held for the university, on
appeal to the CAFC, Duke's contention of experimental use
was rejected.250
The CAFC agreed with Madey that the district court
had applied too broad a standard in respect to the experi-
mental use doctrine on one patent at issue while affirming
the lower court's ruling in respect to nonuse by Duke on
another of Madey's patents. 25 ' The district court had
rejected Madey's claim that part of Duke's business was
"developing possible commercial applications," but the
CAFC notes that commercial intent is only one type of
conduct "immunize[d]" from an experimental use excep-
tion.252 "The correct focus," states the court, "should not be
on the non-profit status of Duke but on the legitimate
business Duke is involved in."253
The precedent relied on in Madey, as well as that cited
earlier by the Deuterium court, is found in the Pitcairn
ruling-it is not an exempted use if the experiments are
conducted as part of the normal course of business. 254 The
Madey opinion is consistent with the narrow interpretation
of experimental use found in Roche and Embrex, but is the
248. Id. at 1352-53.
249. Id. at 1352.
250. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420 (M.D.N.C. 2001), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958
(2003).
251. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1362.
254. Id. See Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 C1.Ct. 624, 631 (1990);
Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125-26 (Ct. C1. 1976). See also
generally Tom Saunders, Note, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants:




reliance that these decisions place on Pitcairn for experi-
mental use law really applicable? 255 In Pitcairn the rejec-
tion of experimental use if the activities "are in keeping
with the legitimate business of the using agency" had little
to do with finding a definitive explanation of experimental
use and everything to do with making sure that a licensee
received due compensation. 256 The suit had been in litiga-
tion for over twenty years; it involved helicopters and parts
worth $639 million that had been produced for the U.S.
government from 1946-64, with the United States planning
on compensation of only $532,279.257 The government's
excuse for such a low reimbursement for the patented prod-
ucts? A number of the helicopters, for part of the time,
were only being tested-it was experimental use.258
This was a taking, not an experimental use defense for
infringement, and the court rightly determined that
compensation was owed, though it is unfortunate that the
special circumstance of governmental mandatory licensing
should be confused with a private party's patent
infringement. 259 When the government uses a patented
invention, it is considered a taking of property in the
eminent domain.260 Patents are called intellectual property,
and therein lies part of the problem.26
1
255. See Pitcairn, 547 F.2d at 1106.
256. Id. at 1125-26.
257. Id. at 1111.
258. Id. at 1124-25.
259. Id. at 1114-15. See also KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 197 (1999).
260. See Pitcairn, 547 F.2d at 1114.
261. The term property was not used in respect to patents until the 1950's in
Europe with the combination of two bureaus-one for Industrial Property and
one for Literary and Artistic Works. In English intellectual property was first
used with the 1967 creation of the World Intellectual Property Organization.
See George Koumantos, Reflections on the Concept of Intellectual Property,
reprinted in GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
PATENT LAW 5 (2002). See also supra note 46 and accompanying text. But see 35
U.S.C. § 261 (1982) (giving patents the attributes of property).
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C. Is an Invention Property?
The U.S. Framers, unlike their European counterparts,
considered it somewhat differently. 262 Thomas Jefferson
stated it succinctly,
He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself
without lessening mine; as he who lites his taper at mine, receives
light without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from
one to another over the globe, for the . . . improvement of his
condition, seems to have been... designed by nature .. .incapa-
ble of confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then
cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
26 3
Lawrence Lessig reminds his readers of the difference
in intellectual property in Europe where the philosophical
basis is the moral right of the inventor. 264 He recognizes
the distinctions of real versus intellectual property and
philosophizes, "With ordinary property, the law must both
create an incentive to produce and protect the right of pos-
session; with intellectual property, the law need only create
the incentive to produce."265 The question in respect to
experimental use needs to be based, not on the moral or
natural right of the original inventor, not on a sweat of the
brow doctrine, but rather on what produces the greatest
benefit to the public. 266
Therefore, the Madey court's emphasis on the Pitcairin
ruling pertaining to the relationship of the business, rather
than the commercial motive used to decide Roche and
Embrex, is misplaced. Pitcairin, with its primary motiva-
tion being to prevent a taking without compensation,
implies a natural right to property or reward for labor,
prominent in European patent laws. 267  It is not the
262. Id.
263. THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1291-92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., The
Library of America 1984).
264. LAWERNCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 134 (1999).
265. Id. at 133.
266. Feist Publ., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (finding
throughout that a sweat of the brow theory is not the basis for U.S. intellectual
property law). See also supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 261.
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economic/utilitarian basis consistent with the purpose and
philosophy underlying U.S. Patent Law.268 (Ironically,
might moral right or sweat of the brow be the real motiva-
tion behind the Madey decision? It was John Madey's laser
equipment that he brought with him when first employed
by Duke University. Even the Solicitor General's brief to
the Supreme Court calls Madey primarily an employment
dispute.269)
The Madey ruling has been widely criticized by institu-
tions and adjudicators alike.270 Justice Newman makes use
of her dissent in the Integra decision to vent dissatisfaction
with the "sweeping dictum" in Madey, as well as the Integra
ruling.2 7 1 She links together Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor
and the common law experimental use exemption noting,
"[T]he statutory immunity of [Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor]
takes effect wherever the research exemption ends. '27
2
The necessity for a research exemption is reiterated in
a brief filed with the request for certiorari in Madey v.
Duke.273 The Consumer Project on Technology and Public
Knowledge opens its brief with a warning, "If patent law too
strongly favors incentives for initial invention, it discour-
ages sequential invention. '274 An opposite opinion is offered
by the Solicitor General's brief arguing, "When the public is
permitted to engage in the unlicensed use of patented
inventions without incurring liability for infringement, even
with respect to 'experimental' uses that may offer other
scientific benefits, the incentives provided by the patent
laws are diminished and the nature of the patent 'bargain'
268. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
269. See Mary Ann Liebert, Certiorari Denied in Madey v. Duke, 22 (5)
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 485, 486-87 (2003) (quoting from Br. of Amicus Curiae
Solicitor General in support of Madey for writ of cert. by Duke University to the
Supreme Court). Madey v. Duke, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
270. See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 254, at 262.
271. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KgaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 n. 10
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005).
272. Id. at 876.
273. Br. of Amicus Curiae of the Consumer Project on Tech. & Pub.
Knowledge in supp. of pet'r, Duke University, for writ of cert. to the Supreme




altered. ' 27 5 What both briefs have in common is the under-
standing that patent law is based on a bargain theory of
reward as an incentive for the public's benefit.276
VI. WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?
A. Broad Infringement Exemptions Denied, but Broad
Patents Allowed
The elimination of Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor for
research tools in Integra and the denial of an experimental
use exception for a research tool in Madey, effectively
negate the possibility of patented biotech tools being
exempted from infringement without licensing from patent
holders.
Though a broad interpretation of the infringement
exemptions is denied to biotech tools, the broad pioneer
patent that stifles improvement, innovation, and competi-
tion for twenty years is still available and being readily
granted to biotech tools. 277  Companies that have been
awarded broad pioneer patents in research tools, described
by the Supreme Court as "a patent covering a function
never before performed, a wholly novel device [so] as to
mark a distinct step in the progress of the art," have the
superior bargaining position in any licensing transaction. 278
The theory behind the granting of broad patent rights for
the first to develop a new technology is that the first inven-
tor has both the incentive and head start to facilitate
further innovation, thereby benefiting the public. 279  In
reality, biotech research is more about a race than
275. See Liebert, supra note 269, at 485 (quoting from Br. of Amicus Curiae
Solicitor General in support of Madey for writ of cert. by Duke University to the
Supreme Court). Madey v. Duke, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
276. See JOYCE, supra note 46.
277. See FTC Rep., supra note 40, Exec. Summ., at 7 ("[Q]uestionable
patents can introduce new kinds of licensing difficulties, such as royalties
stacked one on top of another, and can increase uncertainty . . . complicating
business planning."); id., ch. 3, at 23-24 (discussing the possibility of an
anticommons effect with biotech patents); infra note 309. See also generally
Merges & Nelson, supra note 39.
278. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898).
279. See, e.g., Bar-Shalom & Cook-Deegan, supra note 194, at 663.
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invention, and broad patents mean only that no further
research can stem from that patented discovery without
permission. The PTO maintains that these strict patent
rules prevent the attachment of "free riders" and keep the
system intact in respect to reward as an incentive for
research, with a resulting benefit to the public. The reality
is that no one running in a race is a "free rider. '280
Consider this scenario-Corporate Behemoth A holds
the patent on a biotech tool that Behemoth B would like to
license for a promising search of new biologics to treat leu-
kemia. Behemoth A already markets a leukemia treatment
and plans on using the patented biotech tool on other devel-
opments, or perhaps on no research at all. Is this illegal?
Not at all-though patent misuse can be claimed as a
defense by an infringer, the courts have upheld the rights of
companies to block or simply hold on to patented technol-
ogy. 281 The public loses.
This is not the only scenario possible with large
corporate entities. Behemoth A could agree to negotiate a
license with Behemoth B but demand a royalty rate and/or
upfront payments that are simply too high or unreasonable.
With a high risk that new research will not result in the
development of a commercially viable product,282 Behemoth
280. See, id. at 657 (noting that CellPro was not a "free-rider" ). See also
HALL, infra note 338.
281. Patent misuse is an equitable defense for an accused patent infringer,
and is a means of limiting patent anticompetitive practices that do not rise to
the level of antitrust violations. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976
F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). But see In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. v.
Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding a patent holder's right to
refuse to license or sell patented parts); B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Lab.,
124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper
Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
282. See, e.g., ROBBINS-ROTH, supra note 13, at 112, 123 (noting that it can
take 15 years and $500 million from discovery of a new potential drug to
marketing, or of 5000 compounds that are involved in preclinical testing, only
five will go to human testing and only one of those will be marketed, though the
time can be considerably less for a biologic). But see James Love, Call for More
Reliable Costs Data on Clinical Trials, in MARKETLETTER 24-25 (Jan. 13, 1997)
(noting discrepancies in pharmaceutical reporting of research & development
costs), available at http://www.cptech.org/pharni/marketletter.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2005); Ralph Nader & James Love, Federally Funded Pharmaceutical
Inventions, Test. before the Special Comm. on the Aging, February 24, 1993
(noting that much of the research for new drug development is partially funded
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B's board may reject the offer and forget the leukemia drug.
The public loses.
In yet another scenario, Behemoth B rejects the inflated
licensing offer of Behemoth A, but decides to infringe and
do the research anyway. In the past this might have been a
better risk than paying an excessive fee for a license that
ends up producing no new product or development. Before
Integra, Behemoth B might have been granted safe harbor
from infringement. After Integra, it may be only the compa-
nies close in time to commercialization and FDA approval of
a product that are favored with a safe harbor exemption. 28 3
(Keep in mind that Behemoth A and B are not the only pos-
sible players in these analogies to real-life situations.28 4
Corporate Shrimp A can also make unreasonable demands,
or choose to grant an exclusive license to Behemoth A who
allows the patented biotech tool to sit idle. Or, Shrimp B
and Behemoth C may have already combined resources,
blocking Behemoth B's development in a particular field.28 5)
The Integra ruling appears to result in decreased inno-
vation, but could it actually have a positive effect by moti-
vating larger companies to obtain licenses? 28 6 Not necessar-
ily-companies may still find it less risky to infringe,
by public monies), available at http://www.cptech.org/pharm/pryor.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2005). See also infra notes 348-55 and accompanying text.
283. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KgaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir.
2003), cert granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005). See also infra note 397.
284. See ABATE, supra note 6, at 112-13 (characterizing the market for
biotech tools as "a chaotic arena" with "too many small companies"); OLIVER,
supra note 1, at 201 (describing the alliances formed between small biotech
startups and large pharmaceuticals); BERNICE SCHACTER, ISSUES AND DILEMMAS
OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 94 (1999) (reporting of $1.3 billion investment deals of
biotech companies with large pharmaceuticals in 1996 and more recently at
least 76 alliances with almost exclusively large pharmaceuticals and biotechs).
See also Jon F. Merz, Discoveries: Are There Limits on What May Be Patented?,
in WHO OWNS LIFE?, supra note 1, at 99, 102-11 (discussing a particular
grievous patent licensing case).
285. See, e.g., ABATE, supra note 6, at 45. See also FTC Rep., supra note 40,
ch. 3, at 17 (noting that biotech companies frequently partner with
pharmaceutical companies for commercialization of a product). But see id. at 23-
25 (discussing that blocking or royalty stacking is a possibility).
286. See Nicholas Groombridge & Sheryl Calabro, Integra Lifesciences v.
Merck - Good for Research or Just Good for Research Tool Patent Owners?, 22
(5) BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 462 (2003); Charles Raubicheck et al., Integra v.




particularly if the Integra ruling means biotech tool patent
holders will expect higher licensing fees. Also, an infringe-
ment does not necessarily mean that punitive damages will
be imposed by the court. 287 If the discovery is important
enough, court-imposed royalties may be no more than a
licensing fee, and there is a chance that the court will grant
safe harbor or find the original patent invalid. 288 Injunc-
tions are also less likely to occur if the infringing invention
or activity is close to producing a marketed product. 289
B. Biotech Tools Are Crucial
Biotech tools are absolutely crucial to medical research,
and patents on these tools need not deter sequential inno-
vation if they are reasonably and accessibly licensed.290 The
story of the revolutionizing technique that resulted in
genetic engineering is a case in point.291 In 1973 two scien-
tists inserted a gene for a particular mammalian protein
into a bacterial host cell, with the bacteria then acting as a
mass production factory for that specific protein.292 The
scientists patented the technology on the advice of their
university employer, but the licensing has been available to
all. 293 The result is the genetic expression of recombinant
proteins including the interferons, human growth hormone,
287. See text accompanying supra note 220.
288. See text accompanying supra notes 219-2 1.
289. See generally Warren, supra note 205.
290. See, e.g., FTC Report, supra note 285.
291. Stanley N. Cohen et al., Construction of Biologically Functional
Bacterial Plasmids In Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 3240 (1973).
292. See, e.g., RIFKIN, supra note 1, at 11-12 (calling the Cohen-Boyer
technique a "feat ... rival[ing] the importance of harnessing of fire" and "the
most dramatic technological tool to date in the growing biotechnological
arsenal"). It is interesting to note, however, that simultaneous development
can be considered evidence of obviousness, MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at
747, in which case the Cohen-Boyer technique would be unpatentable since
others were gene splicing at the same time. See, e.g., LISA YOUNT,
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC ENGINEERING 6-7 (2000) (noting the first genetic
engineering experiments in the laboratory of Paul Berg at Stanford University).
293. See, e.g. YOUNT, supra note 292, at 18-19 (noting that Herbert Boyer
would later co-found Genentech, the first company to produce recombinant
insulin and the first biotech company to be publicly owned). See ROBBINS-ROTH,
supra note 13, at 13-28 (detailing the events leading to the start of Genentech).
See also text accompanying supra notes 127-44.
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Factor VIII:C, EPO, insulin, vaccines, and so on as the list
continues to grow. 2
94
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is another biotech tool
that has changed the lives of all within the past two
decades.295 Miniscule amounts of DNA-from a microscopic
fiber, a human hair, or semen-can now be reproduced in
quantities vast enough for identification. 296 The resulting
value to the science of forensics is widely known, but the
discovery has been no less important to biotech and medical
research in the mapping of the human genome, for example,
and in the diagnosis of numerous diseases and condi-
tions.297 PCR was invented in 1983 and already in wide use
in academia when Roche acquired the license to the tech-
nology for $300 million in 1991.298 Although Roche did not
block basic research, the potential to block was there and
may only have been thwarted by intense lobbying from the
research community.2
99
Also crucial to the twentieth century's advances in
medicine, and also widely available to scientific research-
ers, has been the innovating discovery of monoclonal anti-
bodies.300 Monoclonal antibody technology was developed in
1975 by two scientists who would be awarded the Nobel
294. See RIFKIN, supra note 12 and accompanying text. The story of
recombinant human growth hormone is another fascinating example, as a form
of Mad Cow Disease was found to have affected some humans given animal
growth hormone; a moratorium was declared until the recombinant human
form was developed. See National Institute of Neurological Disorders and
Stroke website, at http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/cjd/detail-cjd.htm (noting
the story of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease or Mad Cow developed from growth
hormone) (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
295. See YOUNT, supra note 292, at 26-27.
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., SCHACTER, supra note 284, at 84; Weissmann, supra note 8, at
141-42.
298. See Suzanne T. Michel, Comment, The Experimental Use Exception to
Infringement Applied to Federally Funded Inventions, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 369,
387-88 (1992).
299. Id.
300. See e.g., STEPHEN S. HALL, A COMMOTION IN THE BLOOD: LIFE, DEATH,
AND THE IMMUNE SYSTEM 397-98 (1997) (calling the development of monoclonals




prize for their work. 301 Kohler and Milstein discovered that
by injecting a mouse with an antigen for a particular anti-
body, cells from the mouse's spleen could then be fused with
malignant cells for a mass production of the exact antibody
desired.30 2 The uses of monoclonal antibodies for medical
diagnosis, research, and treatment are myriad. Their avail-
ability has not, however, been dependent upon the
generosity of the patent holder or a licensee as was the case
with genetic engineering and PCR, respectively. 303 The pro-
duction of these specific antibodies, credited along with the
invention of recombinant DNA as the two most important
"pathbreaking" innovations in the biotech revolution, was
widely available because the technology was never pat-
ented.30
4
In contrast to the availability of genetic engineering,
PCR, and monoclonal antibodies, the story behind the pat-
enting of the screening test for two genes linked to breast
cancer is not as successful in respect to public access and af-
fordability.305 The biotech company holding the patent
enforced its rights against researchers and charged an ex-
orbitant price for the screening technology, though the
genes were first identified by part of a coordinate group of




303. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 39, at 905-06.
304. Id. However, the validity of a broad patent for a method of producing
monoclonal antibodies has been upheld by the CAFC, Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (1986), in spite of the wide-spread
contention in the industry that the Hybritech patented method was obvious
since it was a common method used to produce polyclonal antibodies. See
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 745-47. See also ROBBINS-ROTH, supra note
13, at 49-52 (detailing the beginning of Hybritech as a biotech company).
305. See Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human
DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for
Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1650-
51 (2001) (noting that Myriad Genetics, patent holder of the screening test also
holds a patent on the genes themselves, BRCA1 and BRCA2). See also Ari
Berkowitz & Daniel J. Kevles, Patenting Human Genes: The Advent of Ethics in
the Political Economy of Patent Law, in WHO OWNS LIFE?, supra note 1, at 75,
89-90.
306. See Gitter, supra note 305, at 1650-51 (noting that Myriad Genetics
eventually, under pressure, agreed to provide NIH-funded researchers access to
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Adequate examples exist to give evidence that research
and development is not hindered when a patent's scope is
narrow, or research innovation is shared.307 Quite to the
contrary, competition is healthy; it is the anti-competitive
monopoly that requires particular scrutiny and occasional
modification to prevent anemic economies.308 The potential
problem is explained by the "anticommons" effect described
by authors Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg.
30 9
"People often overuse resources they own in common
because they have no incentive to conserve," say Heller and
Eisenberg. 310 In "anticommons" a lack of resources is also
at risk due to scarcity "when too many owners hold rights in
previous discoveries that constitute obstacles to future re-
search. ' 311 Biotech tools, if not already, have the potential of
becoming "anticommons." The expansion of Hatch-
Waxman's exemption illustrates a search by the medical re-
search community to find a safe harbor for its use of biotech
tools and prevent the problem of an "anticommons" short-
age.
VII. WHAT'S THE SOLUTION?
A. A Patent Defense
A suggestion to the problem of sequential technology
being prevented by patent exclusion is given by Robert
the screening tests at about one-half of the public's cost). See also supra note
282.
307. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 39, at 868-76 (criticizing the "prospect
theory" of monopolistic efficiency and noting, "The real problem is not
controlling overfishing, but preventing underfishing after exclusive rights have
been granted.").
308. See, e.g., FTC Rep., supra note 40, Exec. Summ., at 1 ("Competition...
is the organizing principle for most of the U.S. economy. [It] works best to
achieve optimum prices, quantity, and quality of goods and services for
consumers.") See also Merges & Nelson, supra note 39, at 874-75 ("In our own
research, we have not found a single case where the holder of a broad patent
used it effectively through tailored licensing to coordinate the [research and
development] of others.")
309. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter





Merges. 312 He suggests allowing a judicial solution through
the application of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. This
is the defense that the CAFC suggested for Genentech's
recombinant Factor VIII:C, the blood clotting agent
infringing on Scripps's patent. 313 Merges's thesis, dealing
with broad pioneer patents and improved inventions that
are blocked, recognizes a problem particularly in the bio-
tech field. 314 He notes, "Courts have seen that if a socially
beneficial transaction is to take place between the pioneer
and the improver, they must intervene (or at least pose the
threat of intervention)."315 His recommendation is for the
reverse doctrine of equivalents to be applied. The courts
have previously upheld a patent's validity even if the claims
of the patent are not literally infringed. This is called the
doctrine of equivalents in U.S. Patent Law.31 6 The Supreme
Court applied a different doctrine in an 1898 case involving
Westinghouse air brakes on trains. 317 Though the claims of
the pioneer patent were literally infringed by the new inno-
vation, the improved brakes were considered so much more
beneficial that the court looked for a fair solution and
applied a reverse doctrine of equivalents.
318
A reverse doctrine of equivalents has never been ap-
plied by the CAFC though the defense was claimed in at
least four cases in recent decades.31 9 Even Merges admits,
"[T]he chances that a court will apply the doctrine are very
small."320 Yet, he finds, "The primary argument against
compulsory licensing is that it allows courts, not the parties
themselves, to set the terms of exchange."321 At the same
time, Merges states that the reverse equivalents rule is to
be preferred because "it can be implemented by courts with
312. Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75 (1994).
313. See text accompanying supra notes 141-44.
314. See Merges, supra note 312, at 93.
315. Id. at 79.
316. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 915, 938.
317. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537 (1898).
318. Id. at 572.
319. See Merges, supra note 312, at 93 n.79.
320. Id. at 95.
321. Id. at 99.
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no legislative enactment. ' 322 (It is interesting that Merges
does not tout the common objection that compulsory li-
censing reduces the incentive to invent.
23)
B. A Patent Problem
Implementation by the courts is precisely the problem.
It is the courts deciding whether Genentech will be granted
safe harbor, be required to just pay royalties, or face penal-
ties and an injunction. 324 It is the courts deciding whether
Merck's use of a patented peptide to discover a new cancer
drug has sufficiently advanced to grant it safe harbor, or
will royalties be imposed?325 And, if so, will there also be a
penalty and injunction? 326 Bristol Myers was apparently
far enough along to get a safe harbor exemption for its use
of the patented taxol intermediates, 327 and Amcell was al-
lowed to continue its commercial activities with patented
322. Id. at 105 n.102.
323. See, e.g., Joseph A. Yosick, Note, Compulsory Patent Licensing for
Efficient Use of Inventions, U. ILL. L. REV. 1275 (2001).
Compulsory licensing has been opposed on the grounds that it would
diminish the purpose of the patent system by reducing inventors'
incentive to develop new technologies and encouraging inventors to
keep inventions secret. The possibility of a compulsory license would
reduce the value of the patent; therefore, inventors would be less likely
to invest money to develop a new invention because the return on
investment would be smaller. Inventors would be more likely to keep
the invention secret, if feasible, rather than patent it, to avoid the
possibility of a license being granted. These two results would defeat
the main purposes of the patent system: to promote innovation and to
encourage disclosure of inventions.
Id. at 1291-92.
324. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379
(N.D. Cal. 1987). See also text accompanying supra notes 213-15.
325. Integra Lifesciences I, LTD. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir.
2003), cert granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005). See also text accompanying supra
notes 216-20.
326. See text accompanying supra notes 216-20.
327. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95-8833,
2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001). See also text accompanying supra
note 178.
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antibodies. 328 Embrex, however, infringed when it tried to
design around,329 and Duke's use of a research tool cannot
be exempted because it is part of Duke's business to do re-
search. 33
0
Not only in respect to Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor and
common law experimental use, but in numerous other pat-
ent validity cases the courts determine whether biotech
tools will be used to the maximum potential for the public's
benefit. Hybritech's patent on a procedure for using mono-
clonal antibodies is ruled by the courts to be nonobvious so
the patent is valid, 331 but the Sibia Neurosciences patent on
a screening method for detecting possible new drugs is
obvious, and the patent is invalid.332 The CAFC reversed it-
self and ruled that Enzo Biochem's patent of a DNA probe,
allowing the diagnosis of gonorrhea to be distinguished
from meningitis, is valid without a complete sequence of the
DNA, 333 but Eli Lilly's insulin patent and Amgen's EPO
patent are invalid because the DNA sequences are
missing.3 34 The University of Rochester's pioneer patent, al-
lowing painkillers to be produced without gastrointestinal
328. Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Amcell Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 407 (Del.
2001), amended by 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (Del. 2002). See also text accompanying
supra notes 199-203.
329. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
See also text accompanying supra notes 236-43.
330. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See also text
accompanying supra notes 250-53.
331. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
1986). See also supra notes 67 and 304, and accompanying text.
332. Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). Sibia's patent was on a method for rapidly screening reactions to the
signal transduction pathway in cells-an important means of identifying
potential drug candidates. The CAFC reversed the district court's ruling of
patent validity. See also Parentoni, supra note 10 (discussing the signal
transduction pathway in cells).
333. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Incorp., 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir.
2002) vacated en banc, 323 F.3d 956. See also generally John C. Stolpa, Note,
Toward Aligning the Law with Biology? The Federal Circuit's About Face in
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 339 (2003).
334. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (ruling that "[an adequate written description of a DNA [sequence]
requires a precise definition"); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d
1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (ruling that analogues of EPO claimed could not be
so numerous as to require undue experimentation to obtain).
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side effects, is ruled too broad by the court, 335 but Johns
Hopkins University's pioneer patent on a stem cell mono-
clonal antibody is not too broad. 336
Court decisions in respect to biotech tools are fre-
quently fraught with subjectivity and often inconsistent.
There is no reason to believe that application of the reverse
doctrine of equivalents by the courts would be the
exception, creating objectivity and consistency. Nor would
applying the reverse doctrine of equivalents provide any in-
centive to the patent holder of biotech research tools.
33 7 It is
not in the public's best interest to eliminate the reward al-
together, just be sure that it is spread around to all
involved in the chase.338 Research and development in bio-
technology is a conjoined effort. The reverse doctrine of
equivalents is not the solution.
C. New Legislation-Experimental Use Defense
The key to finding a solution may be found in an
amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court regarding Madey
v. Duke.339 The Solicitor General states that the policy is-
sues "may be better suited for legislative rather than judi-
335. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D.Searle & Co., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216
(W.D.N.Y. 2003), affl'd, 358 F. 3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also infra note 355
and accompanying text.
336. Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303 (D. Del. 1996),
978 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1997), affd in part, vacated in part by 152 F.3d 1342
(Fed. Cir. 1998). See also text accompanying supra notes 192-97.
337. See FTC Rep., supra note 40, ch. 3, at 20, 22 (stressing the importance
to the biotech industry to have viable patents on biotech tools in order to raise
capital for research and development).
338. See text accompanying supra notes 279-80. The race analogy is used
frequently in medical research involving biotechnology. Stephen Hall, in
describing the cloning of interferon, states, "Science has always had its
competitive ... interludes [with] occasionally cutthroat races [in] an era
marked by rivalries between academic laboratories and biotechnology
companies, and sometimes even within laboratories and within companies."
HALL, supra note 300, at 181. See also Merges & Nelson, supra note 39, at 870.
For an interesting discussion of the "chase" of DNA sequencing with a reward
for the "capture, " in the mode of Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1805), see MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 858-59. But see Enzo, 323 F.2d at
969-70 (ruling that the chase is sufficient for reward without capture).
339. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420 (M.D.N.C. 2001), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958
(2003).
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cial consideration."340  The 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act was
just such a legislative response following the court's refusal
to grant an experimental use exception in Roche v. Bolar.
341
A clamor for reform, as after the Roche decision, can again
be heard following Integra and Madey.342 As was also true
with Hatch-Waxman's passage, it is the underlying policy
concerns that need to be addressed, not just a reversal of
one court decision.343 Congress can be urged to bring about
change, but it needs to be the correct change-change bene-
fiting the public. Unfortunately not all pressure on legisla-
ture is beneficial to the public in regard to biotechnology. 344
Legislation regarding an experimental use defense for
patented research would face a particular problem under
TRIPS. 345 A broad experimental use exception in the United
States could result in developing countries returning to
their pre-TRIPS practice of not allowing patents on phar-
maceuticals. 346 Other countries could return to experimen-
tal use exceptions for pharmaceuticals, allowing generic
drugs to be sold before international companies' patents
had expired-the very thing the United States lobbied to
exclude in TRIPS by requiring a clause that no field could
be exempt from patentability. 347
There is another problem in regard to legislation
granting an experimental use exemption from infringe-
ment. Universities are tied to commercial entities. Pharma-
340. See Liebert, supra note 269.
341. See text accompanying supra notes 81-92.
342. See Groombridge & Calabro, supra note 286, at 468 (noting that
Integra is a clear "change of direction" and that "preclinical research work must
now be considered outside the scope of [safe harbor]"); Jeffrey L. Fox, U.S.
Courts Narrow Patent Exemptions, 21 (8) NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 834 (2003)
(quoting David Korn, senior vice president of the Assoc. of Amer. Medical
Colleges-"[T]he two rulings . . . raise policy concerns for both industry and
academic institutions."); Saunders, supra note 254, at 262 ("[T]he Madey court
erred ... [I]t also undermines the balance between innovation and access that
lies at the heart of the Patent Act.").
343. See text accompanying supra notes 91-94.
344. See, e.g., SHELFON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE
LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? 103-04 (2003) (noting
conflicts of interest in government agencies).
345. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
347. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 59.
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ceutical, healthcare, and biotech companies collaborate with
universities by building laboratories, conducting research,
and obtaining licenses to the patents obtained. 348 As one
author notes, "Companies are increasingly looking to re-
search universities as sources for new technologies, and are
competing with each other to gain preferential access to
university labs, especially in biotechnology. ' 349 In 1982
Washington University in St. Louis started the trend when
a major company committed $50 million for biotech
research. 350 Stanford University has recouped millions of
dollars just from its recombinant DNA license.3 51 In 1999
Columbia University received $20 million in royalties on
just one glaucoma drug. 352 An oncologist/professor at the
Oregon Health Sciences University collaborates with an in-
ternational pharmaceutical company to produce one of the
biggest leukemia breakthrough drugs ever.3 53 Even small
348. See generally KRIMSKY, supra note 344 (writing of the entanglement of
university research with commercial interests); Joshua A. Newberg & Richard
L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law, Values and Rules of
Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 187
(2002).
349. PORT, supra note 259, at 139.
350. See id. This climate of university/business partnerships began with
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. Congress approved the legislation to
promote research and development by encouraging universities to patent
inventions and license them to businesses. Bayh-Dole was originally designed to
aid small businesses and to allow the government to purchase drugs, developed
with government aid, more cheaply. The government has not taken advantage
of the provision, and the bill was amended long ago to allow large companies to
become partners with universities through licensing of patented inventions.
Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94
Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2002)). See also, e.g.,
Bar-Shalom & Cook-Deegan, supra note 194, at 637; Robert Lee Hotz, Falling
From Grace: Science and the Pursuit of Profit, in WHO OWNS LIFE?, supra note
1, at 175, 180 ("By 1994, 90 percent of companies involved in the life sciences
had developed formal ties with academic researchers, and 92 percent of
university-based researchers in the life sciences reported they received some
form of support from companies."); KRIMSKY, supra note 344, at 30-31 (detailing
some of the other congressional acts that have fostered relationships between
university research and industry besides Bayh-Dole).
351. See Newberg & Dunn, supra note 348, at 201 n.48.
352. Jeff Gerth & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Drug Makers Reap Profits on Tax-
Backed Research, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000, at Al.
353. See Oregon Health & Sciences University, News Release, Brian Druker
Recieves $7.5 Million Leukemia Grant (Aug. 3, 2000), available at
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schools are seeking to cash in on the monies available
through partnerships with big business, with nearly every
campus sporting an Office of Technology Transfer.354 The
University of Rochester's recent lawsuit highlights the size
of royalties and license fees available, as the school believes
it forfeited billions of dollars from the district court's ruling
of patent invalidity.3
55
A more convincing argument for legislation of an
experimental use exemption in patent law lies in the com-
parison with its closest counterpart in copyright law, the
fair use exemption. 356 In 1976 Congress adopted major revi-
sions to the Copyright Act, among them making statutory
the common law exemption of fair use.357 The courts have
interpreted this fair use exemption to allow infringement of
copyrighted elements in a computer system in order to get
at functional (unprotected by copyright) elements. 358 How
can biotech research be less important?
359
http://www.ohsu.edu/news/archive/2000/080300druker.html (last visited Mar.
14, 2005). See also supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
354. See KRIMSKY, supra note 344, at 165-66 (estimating 1,000 university-
industry research centers were established in over 200 universities just in the
first decade after the Bayh-Dole Act's passage).
355. See Andrew Pollack, Battling Searle, University Gets Broad Patent for
New Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000, at C1. The interesting sidenote to
this story is that the patent ruled invalid was for cox-2 inhibitors-better
known by the brand names of which Vioxx is now infamous. Although
Rochester's lawsuit was with the manufacturer of Celebrex, the invalid patent
covered all cox-2 inhibitors. Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market in
September of 2004; Celebrex and others continue to be sold, though an apparent
increased risk of cardiac events exists for all. See Mary Duenwald, For Pain
Management, Doctors Prescribe Caution, N.Y. TIMES, FEB. 20, 2005, at 11. See
also supra note 335 and accompanying text.
356. A fair use exemption from infringement in copyright has been
expanded by the courts from limited photocopying for educational use, to
allowing some copying of protected elements in computer object codes. 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1992). See also infra note 358.
357. The 1976 revisions replaced the prior Copyright Act of 1909. Copyright
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-803 (2003)).
358. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th
Cir. 1993).
359. In 1990 an amendment to the Patent Act failed to pass that would have
provided a broad experimental use exception. Patent Competitiveness and
Technological Innovation Act, H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. §402 (1990). Justice
Newman mentions the fair use of copyright in her Integra dissent. Integra
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Congress has tinkered with patent law on a number of
occasions in recent decades. 360 Besides the 1984 Hatch-
Waxman Act, legislation was passed in 1997 that provides
another exemption for patent infringement liability.361 A
claim of infringement had been filed against a physician for
using a patented incision technique during eye surgery;
Congress reacted with an amendment to U.S. Patent
Law.36 2 Legislators addressed a need to limit the scope on
patent infringement involving critical medical procedures.
Biotech research is no less important; the importance is just
less apparent.
Congress and the courts clearly recognize that some-
times, for the benefit of the public, changes are necessary in
intellectual property law. The Constitution states that
patent monopolies are limited, and the purpose is always to
benefit the public.36 3  Legislation providing for an
experimental use exemption for research may not, however,
be the best solution when universities are so closely inter-
twined with commercial enterprises.364 In addition, the
small start-up biotech companies that have taken an in-
creased financial risk in development of biotech tools, 36 5 are
insistent that patents are an essential element in attracting
investment capital. 366 A legislated experimental use exemp-
tion has the potential of drying up necessary funding,
because it does not allow the biotech tool inventor (start-up
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005).
360. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (1977), the Atomic Energy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2183(c) (1992), and the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2404
(1994), all have provisions for compulsory licensing of patents.
361. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1999)).
362. Id. See also Bradley J. Meier, The New Patent Infringement Liability
Exception for Medical Procedures, 23 J. LEGIs. 265 (1997).
363. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
364. See supra notes 348-55 and accompanying text. But see generally
Michel, supra note 298; Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair" Rethinking
the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research
Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001).
365. See WOLFF, supra note 5, at 16 ("No other industrial group spends
anything near [the] proportion of total revenues on research [as biotech], not
even the major pharmaceutical companies").
366. See FTC Rep., supra note 40, ch. 3, at 1.
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company) to be rewarded with a patent that has monetary
value. It is not the best answer to the problem of availabil-
ity of biotech research tools. There is a different solution
that is reasonable, equitable, and acceptable.
D. New Legislation-Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing is a solution that is reasonable,
equitable, and acceptable to the American public.
Compulsory licensing of biotech tools will ensure that medi-
cal research is unimpeded by blocking tactics, licensing in-
equities, and inconsistent court decisions.
Compulsory licensing is not a new concept in the
United States.3 67 Required licensing may be imposed by the
courts or by the FTC to prevent anticompetitive
practices. 368 Specific instances of pharmaceutical companies
trying to circumvent the requirements of the Hatch-
Waxman Act have resulted in severe penalties.3 69 As a
result of some of these cases, guidelines for licensing related
to intellectual property endeavors were published by the
367. The Hart Bill of 1993 and Affordable Prescription Drugs Act were
unsuccessful in passing compulsory licensing related to health care costs. H.R.
1708, 107th Cong. (2001). The anthrax scare in 2001 led to talk of compulsory
licensing of Cipro before the manufacturer lowered the cost. Public Health
Emergency Medicines Act, H.R. 3235, 107th Cong. (2001). See, e.g., Colleen
Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853,
867-68 (2003). In a 1945 case the Ninth Circuit suggested that compulsory
licensing could be required of a patent that produced Vitamin D in foods by
ultraviolet radiation. Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research
Found., 146 F.2d 941, 945-46 (9th Cir. 1945).
368. See In re Intel Corp., F.T.C. Order No. 9288 (Aug. 3, 1999); United
States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973). See also James Love & Michael
Palmedo, Examples of Intellectual Property in the United States, Ch. III:
Compulsory Licensing as Remedy to Anticompetitive Practices, Consumer
Project on Technology (2001), available at http://cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-
at.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
369. Bristol-Myers, for example, paid fines of $670 million for filing new
frivolous patents to prevent generic brands from entering the market and for
paying rival generic-brand companies to keep the cheaper drug off the market.
See John R. Wilke, Bristol-Myers Settles Charges of Patent-Law Abuse, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 10, 2003, at A5. Abbott Laboratories is another company receiving an
administration order against it for negotiating to keep a generic brand drug off
the market. In re Abbott Labs., F.T.C. Order No. C-3945 (May 22, 2000). See
also supra note 108.
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FTC and Department of Justice. 370 Licensing of patented
products can also be required if needed by the military or
other government agencies. 371 In addition, a provision in
the Bayh-Dole Act allows the government to "march-in," re-
quiring licensing to a third-party in certain circum-
stances.372 Incredibly, compulsory licensing exists under
U.S. Copyright Law in respect to public performance of
recorded music. 373 Is this benefit to the public more impor-
tant than the availability of biotech tools?
The importance of compulsory licensing for research is
recognized outside of the United States. Required licensing
for medical research is allowed in nearly the entire devel-
oped world.374 European countries with provisions for
compulsory licensing in their patent laws include Denmark,
France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. 37
5
The United Kingdom and Japan allow compulsory licensing
370. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
371. The government's taking of a patented invention was conceived with
military needs in mind. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2001). See also supra notes 256-60
and accompanying text.
372. Why isn't this enough to require licensing of biotech tools? Even if
university research was involved in some way with the development of a biotech
tool, most university-industry agreements are private and accountability to the
public is lacking. See generally KRIMSKY, supra note 344; Bar-Shalom & Cook-
Deegan, supra note 194, at 651-54 (doubting whether the Bayh-Dole "march-in"
rights will ever be used); Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents,
Products, and Public Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095. See also Nat'l Inst. of Health, Determination in the
Case of Petition of CellPro, Inc. (Aug. 1997), available at http://www.nih.gov/
news/pr/archives/index.htm. (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). After Judge McKelvie's
initial ruling, CellPro petitioned the NIH to require Baxter (holder of Johns
Hopkins's government-funded patents) to license CellPro's use of the Johns
Hopkins monoclonal antibodies, but the "march-in" request was denied. See
supra text accompanying notes 192-97.
373. Copyright Law establishes six statutory compulsory licenses that
include, besides cable and satellite transmissions, the use of some copyrighted
works by noncommercial broadcasters, the reproduction of nondramatic musical
works, and the performance of digitalized sound recording transmissions. 17
U.S.C. §§ 111, 114, 115, 118, 119, 122 (2002).
374. See supra note 126.
375. See Balasubramaniam & Goldman, supra note 126. Besides medicine,
food, and medical research, the most common compulsory licensing provisions
are allowed for nonuse and blocking patents. See, e.g., Kurt M. Saunders, Patent
Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression,
15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 389, 438-39 (2002).
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if a patented invention is not being used.376 Canada, pres-
sured to abolish its compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals
under TRIPS, still allows a compulsory license for nonuse of
a patented invention. 377 TRIPS, Articles 30 and 31, though
somewhat vaguely written, make provision for countries to
allow compulsory licensing.378 Article 31 includes a list of
possible circumstances including nonuse, national emer-
gency, governmental use, and anti-competitive practices. 379
Yet another condition allows required licensing where one
invention "cannot be exploited without infringing another
patent."380 On this basis compulsory licensing of biotech
tools is in compliance with TRIPS.381
A common objection to compulsory licensing is that it
reduces the incentive to invent, but at least one study on
the results of required licensing under FTC rulings found
no evidence of economic harm to the system or loss of
research and development. 38 2 In some cases, just the exis-
tence of a compulsory licensing statute has been sufficient
to see licenses negotiated voluntarily. 383 Another common
objection to any type of compulsory licensing is that it has a
negative effect on competition. On the contrary, in the case
of biotech tools compulsory licensing should increase
competition in the downstream development of inventions.
(Remember, patents are monopolies!) As noted by Heller
376. See Yosick, supra note 323, at 1289-90.
377. See, e.g., Kripapuri, supra note 59, at 686-87.
378. Article 30 allows for "limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent," and Article 31 lists the requirements for such "other use
of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder."
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 58, arts. 30, 31.
379. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 58, art. 31.
380. Id.
381. See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 375, at 437-39. But see Gitter, supra
note 305, at 1683 (taking the view that TRIPS would need modification for
required licensing of patented DNA sequences).
382. See Chien, supra note 367, at 873.
383. Provision by pharmaceutical companies of a cheaper supply of AIDS
drugs in Africa may have been a direct result of the threat of emergency
compulsory licensing allowed by TRIPS, as pressure was brought upon drug
companies by both government and stockholders. See Donald G. McNeil, Bush
Keeps Clinton Policy on Poor Lands' Need for AIDS Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2001, at A9. The threat of lawsuits, by AIDS-drug patent holders upon generic
makers sending drugs to Africa, was dropped.
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and Eisenberg, "[A]n unintended and paradoxical conse-
quence of biomedical privatization [is that the] proliferation
of intellectual property rights upstream may be stifling life-
saving innovations downstream.
s38 4
A more compelling and probably a more honest
objection to compulsory licensing is the slippery slope ar-
gument. Require licensing of biotech tools, and what's
next? What about agricultural and environmental concerns?
Aren't they important too? And though small biotech firms
may not object, it is the fear of plunging down a slippery
slope that would have large pharmaceutical companies
vociferously lobbying against any such compulsory licensing
of biotech tools. The answer to this objection lies not only in
the vital importance of biotech, but also in the speed with
which changes occur in this unique industry. A 2003 Report
by the Federal Trade Commission notes, "[T]he pace of
innovation in the biotechnology industry is so rapid that by
the time a court determines the question of patent validity,
the research or product opportunity has passed."38 5 Another
observer of the biotech industry has calculated the result of
all patent approvals since 1977 and found biotech patents
increased sevenfold in twenty years while all patent
approvals in the same time period increased by only 60 per-
cent.38 6 This economist has analyzed the number of biotech
patent approvals and used this figure as a basis for calcu-
lating accumulation of knowledge.38 7 He states, "Commer-
cial biotechnology knowledge has been increasing exponen-
tially in recent years .... [T]he rate of daily doubling [of
biotech knowledge] could be reached in 2005. ' 388 There
clearly is a difference in biotech that needs addressing.
384. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 309, at 698.
385. FTC Rep., supra note 40, ch. 3, at 21. It is interesting, and
noteworthy, first that the FTC is involving itself with patent issues, and then
that the FTC Report's conclusion lies in recommendations to change PTO
procedures rather than mention of compulsory licensing. See id., Exec. Summ.,
at 1-16. The report lists some panelist remarks, however, that indicate biotech
patents in the PTO do receive higher scrutiny by the PTO, but other panelists
listed problems with biotech patents in particular. Id., ch. 3, at 20-21.
386. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 56. See also WOLFF, supra note 5, at 14-17, 45.
387. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 56-69.
388. Id. at 58-59.
2005]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
E. Implementation of Compulsory Licensing
How might compulsory licensing of biotech tools work?
One suggestion is to wait and determine the size of the
royalty or fee after the commercial value of the downstream
invention has been determined. 38 9 Reach-through royalties,
where licenses can continue to collect fees on downstream
inventions, has been suggested as a means of risk sharing
and reducing upfront costs. 390 This could create a problem
of royalty stacking and is probably not a good suggestion
unless the end product actually contains the research
tool.391
If no license fee is initially provided for use of the bio-
tech tool, there is no immediate incentive to the biotech tool
inventor. Rather, reward the inventor with an upfront fee,
allowing the biotech tool's scope to determine the amount. A
pioneer biotech tool with a broad scope should actually
receive a lesser fee since more licensees will be utilizing it.
A biotech tool with fewer applications may command a
higher initial fee, though options could be made available
allowing the licensee a time period to decide the value of
the tool to its research. The biotech tool inventor still re-
ceives the incentive to continue through the option fee, and
the market will dictate whether the reward is high enough
to act as an incentive for further development. 392 Some
limited royalty arrangements could still be included (as
when the biotech tool is actually a component in the down-
stream invention), with the actual monetary percents
389. See Gitter, supra note 305, at 1679.
390. See FTC Rep., supra note 40, ch. 3, at 26-27 (recommending reach
through royalties as a possibility). But see Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 309,
at 699 (noting that reach through licensing increases the possibility of
"anticommons").
391. With a recent CAFC affirmation in Bayer v. Housey, finding no
infringement on patented cell-based assays performed abroad, with the drugs
identified by those assays then imported into the United States, pharmaceutical
companies are unlikely to risk licensing an assay that requires reach-through
royalties. They can simply import into the United States the information on the
drug candidate and then generate the data that is "reasonably related" to FDA
approval under Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor. Bayer Ag v. Housey Pharm., Inc.,
169 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Del. 2001), affld, 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
392. See PORT, supra note 259, at 162-63, 209-219 (discussing valuation for
the purpose of computing royalties in licensing).
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dictated by the particular field of use in which the tool is
eventually commercialized. 393
Compliance with TRIPS would require that the compul-
sory license be non-exclusive. 394 Cross-licensing could be
possible (with a lesser initial fee, for example) and non-
blocking agreements required. 395 It is not being suggested
that implementation of compulsory licensing of biotech tools
would be easy. Valuation, monitoring, and enforcement are
all issues that would need to be addressed-if not by the
parties negotiating themselves, then in arbitration with
third parties from within the industry.3 96 The issues, how-
ever, are the same ones that must now be dealt with in
voluntary licensing.
CONCLUSION
In 1984 the passage of Hatch-Waxman addressed a par-
ticular problem related to a population phenomenon-the
need for cheaper drugs for a rapidly graying population. A
similar response is needed today-not to provide generic
drugs for the older generation, but to ensure that medical
advancement continues unimpeded for the future genera-
tion. The courts' expansion of Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor
provision up to the Integra decision is evidence of a void
existing in U.S. Patent Law regarding accessibility of pat-
ented biotech tools. 397 At the same time the courts have con-
393. Id.
394. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 58, art. 31(d) ("such use shall be non-
exclusive"). Biotech companies may prefer non-exclusive licensing, though at
present only about one-half of the licensing agreements are non-exclusive. See
FTC Rep., supra note 40, ch. 3, at 28 (noting that exclusive licensing commits
the biotech company to a product that may never be developed).
395. See PORT, supra note 259, at 402-03. See also Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property, supra note 111; FTC Rep., supra note 40,
ch. 3, at 26-29 (discussing licensing for biotech tools).
396. See PORT, supra note 259, at 433-38 (discussing present alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms available for licensing disputes).
397. At the time of this publication, the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in the Integra decision. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
125 S.Ct. 823 (2005). Reversing the CAFC ruling would expand Hatch-Waxman
but would probably be seen as a weakening of patent law. Remanding for
possible consideration of experimental use seems unlikely after Madey, and
remanding for patent validity would also be problematic. Congress needs to
consider compulsory licensing of biotech tools, regardless of the Supreme
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tinued to apply the experimental use defense with a strict
adherence to the rights of the patent holder as found in
Madey v. Duke.
Legislating an experimental use exemption is not the
best response to this problem. It is not necessary that
biotech tools be freely available, only that they be reasona-
bly and readily available. Compulsory licensing provides
biotech companies with the incentive to produce research
tools. Compulsory licensing allows Hatch-Waxman's safe
harbor to be used for its intended purpose. Compulsory
licensing does not require exceeding the narrow boundaries
of common law experimental use. Compulsory licensing
guarantees that the public will receive the intended benefit
that is the basis for U.S. Patent Law.
Is it time for compulsory licensing of biotech tools? Yes.
Court's decision.
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